

volving the operation of the FBI, and the rights of citizens in a free society.

WIDE RANGE

The FBI's recent investigations have included such areas as these:

A national magazine discovered in 1964 that the FBI had compiled—for unexplained reasons—a dossier on the ex-wife of one of its writers. The material in the file was cited by Hoover's associates in refusing to allow the writer to sit in on an interview with the FBI director.

The managing editor of a prominent newspaper in the Midwest was advised by a U.S. District Attorney in 1965 that a reporter for the paper had become persona non grata at the Federal building because of "derogatory information" circulated by the FBI.

University professors and Americans in other walks of life have become aware within the past year that they have been under surveillance both here and in their foreign travels at the instigation of the FBI.

The authors of books critical of the Federal establishment are the subject of dossiers in the FBI files.

The investigations that have produced these materials are based on almost unlimited authority to probe into the lives of suspected criminals, "security risks" and "subversive." The Attorney General, the Justice Department says, provides only "general" supervision over these activities.

The grant of investigative authority to the director of the FBI is, in other words, extremely broad, and the Justice Department now finds itself in the position of trying to define the limits in terms of eavesdropping and wiretaps.

The irony is that it has taken the Federal drive against "organized crime" and the Bobby Baker case to bring the issue to a head.

VIETNAM PEACE EFFORTS

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, in regard to Vietnam, I believe that the mood of the American people is to offer reasonable proposals to bring the struggle to a conclusion. The report in today's New York Times to the effect that we have offered a "reciprocal lessening of hostilities"—a proposal similar to the one I have been making for a military freeze—is such a reasonable first step proposal. I must also point out, however, that the American mood has another dimension—that if our opponents in Vietnam continue their unwise practice of curtly rejecting such peace offers, the reaction of the U.S. people will be even more resolute.

If the Communists are strategizing their policy on the assumption that the United States lacks staying power in Vietnam—that the American people will become tired—they are pursuing precisely the wrong course. I say this as one who has been against escalation and has questioned certain aspects of our policy in Vietnam. The Communists have only to remember the fact that we still have over 50,000 American troops in Korea. The American people become more, not less resolute, in pursuing a struggle when they believe that our Government is making good faith peace offers.

The proposal for a military freeze reportedly made by our Government is both practical and reasonable. The fact that the Communists have rejected it out of hand, and the further fact that they continue to insist on the unconditional cessation of bombing in the North without reciprocity on their part should be clear

indication that they are not yet seeking peace as they profess.

As long as the Communists continue in their opposition to peace, we must concentrate our efforts on helping the people of South Vietnam to hold free elections and create a duly-elected civilian government to carry on the struggle. Under the circumstances, this is the best way to guarantee the resolute spirit of the American people in respect of Vietnam.

Last Saturday, the President issued a most important statement on Vietnam in terms of its emphasis on military solutions. The President was, in effect, providing the rationale for the further escalation of the conflict. This is in line with Secretary McNamara's announcement that by the end of this year, U.S. troops in Vietnam will number at least 400,000.

I am fully aware of the reasons for this decision—the stubborn and persistent refusal of NLF and Hanoi leaders—with Communist China and the U.S.S.R. backing them—to negotiate and the increasing infiltration into South Vietnam of regular North Vietnamese forces. But, I believe that as the President commits the United States to a large increase in our forces at this time—up to about the maximum I and many others had ever visualized—he should continue to make other realistic attempts by private and public means to put a lid on the fighting and to bring about a peace conference of all relevant parties.

I stress the word "realistic" because many of the proposals recently made, such as cease fires and high-level diplomatic meetings, are not realistic if the other side will not respond. And, at this stage of the Vietnam conflict, there is probably little hope for a prolonged or extended cease fire. More likely, as in the Korean war, fighting will occur during the negotiations themselves. The establishment of a cease fire, as a practical matter, probably will be the business of the conference itself. The proposal for a Foreign Ministers' meeting is similarly impractical at this point. There must be someone to talk with and something to talk about, some common ground, before talks can proceed profitably at this high level.

Therefore, a first step toward peace should deal with the problem of escalation itself, for while the conflict is escalating there is little likelihood that discussion could begin.

I would, therefore, like to reiterate my proposal for a military freeze; that is, a ceiling on the present magnitude of battle particularly in respect to the introduction of new troops. Such a freeze could be agreed to by the parties involved prior to the actual peace conference. This would consist of a pledge by the United States that it will stop sending additional troops into South Vietnam in return for a pledge by North Vietnam to halt the infiltration of its soldiers into South Vietnam; the freeze should be subject to international verification by the U.N., the I.C.C.—India, Poland, and Canada—or any other agreeable international body.

I agree that the United States may have to step up its operation in the south

and also "raise the cost of aggression at its source," but I would urge the President to make another try to avoid the further escalation of the conflict.

Mr. President, in this connection, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point an article published in the New York Times of June 22, 1966.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, June 22, 1966]
HANOI SAID TO BAR LATEST U.S. OFFER FOR PEACE PARLEY—PLANS FOR TALKS WHILE BOTH SIDES REDUCE THE FIGHTING IS REPORTED SPURNED—PROPOSAL CALLED FRAUD—U.S. AID GOES TO OTTAWA, PERHAPS TO SEE AID WHO VISITED NORTH VIETNAM

(By Seymour Topping)

HONG KONG, June 21.—North Vietnam was reported today to have rejected a United States proposal for the opening of peace talks while both sides reduce military activities.

Communist officials have told foreign diplomats in Hanoi, according to reliable reports reaching American sources here, that the United States bid was simply another "peace offensive fraud" perpetrated by the Johnson Administration.

[William P. Bundy, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, flew from Washington to Ottawa Tuesday, presumably for a report on the latest Canadian peace approach to Hanoi. The Associated Press reported. A special Canadian envoy, Chester Ronning, has just returned to Ottawa from Hanoi.]

As a prerequisite to negotiations, Hanoi is demanding unconditional cessation of United States bombing of North Vietnam, without any commitment that the Communist country would diminish sending troops and supplies to aid the Vietcong guerrillas in South Vietnam.

The impression of diplomats stationed in Hanoi is that the North Vietnamese are still determined to prosecute the war, in the hope that the Saigon Government will collapse politically or that President Johnson's Administration will be compelled to withdraw United States troops under pressure of public opinion at home.

North Vietnamese regiments have massed in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam, apparently to deal a blow during the monsoon season that would discourage the United States war effort.

DIPLOMATS HEAR RESPONSE

North Vietnamese officials have stated their attitude in talks with foreign diplomats and with Communist delegates who attended the congress of the Czechoslovak Communist party in Prague this month.

The United States offer for a reciprocal lessening of hostilities as a basis for peace negotiations was conveyed to North Vietnam through the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw between the United States and Communist China, through Eastern European channels, and presumably, by Chester Ronning, special envoy of Canada, who recently visited Hanoi.

Mr. Ronning left Hanoi last Saturday to return to Ottawa after three days of talks with the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Nguyen Duy Trinh. The Canadian envoy visited Hanoi on a similar mission in effort to bring North Vietnam and the United States to the conference table. Canada has extended her good offices within the framework of truce machinery established by the International Control Commission for Vietnam, of which she is a member.

North Vietnamese officials, commenting on the Ronning mission, said that the Canadian envoy was given an explanation of a letter sent by President Ho Chi Minh of North

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wiretaps and electronic 'bugs' on hoodlums and foraged through their refuse for clues."

This type of activity—during Rogers' term of office but without Rogers' knowledge—has been independently confirmed by highly placed sources in the Justice Department.

In Black's case, it has been argued that the "bug" placed in his hotel suite in Washington did not qualify technically as a "wiretap." Solicitor General Marshall described it as a listening device . . . not a telephone wiretap.

Any "listening device," however, will monitor at least one end of a telephone conversation and this in itself was an apparent violation of Justice Department policy in 1963. Sen. HOWARD CANNON (D-Nev.) wrote to Attorney General Kennedy on Nov. 7 and again on Nov. 15, 1963, for an explanation of the Department's policy on wiretapping and "bugging."

DISCLAIMED AS POLICY

Katzenbach, who was then Kennedy's deputy, promptly replied: "As a matter of policy this department does not wiretap, monitor or record telephone communications in any other type of matter except where there is consent of an actual party to the conversation."

At that very time, however, the FBI was not only "bugging" men like Black but was actively "wiretapping" in the traditional meaning of the word.

Thus, a grave question of credibility is involved, not only in the Black affair, but in the Baker case, the "massive wiretapping and eavesdropping" operation in Las Vegas, the wiretapping and eavesdropping operation in Kansas City, if not in other American cities.

Other questions have arisen. Why was the FBI "bugging" a neighbor of Lyndon B. Johnson, who was then Vice President, if, as Marshall said, the Justice Department had not ordered it and if, as he also said, it had nothing to do with Black's income tax case?

If on the other hand, the Justice Department was fully aware of the FBI's electronic surveillance campaign—as associates of Hoover flatly maintain—why was Marshall's statement submitted to the Court?

These are questions to which the Court itself has demanded answers.

[From the Washington Post, June 21, 1966]
KENNEDY DESPISED IT—PRESIDENTS FORBODE
USE OF WIRETAPPING

(By Richard Harwood)

So far as the American public has been aware, wiretapping and eavesdropping—except in rare cases involving national security—have been contrary to the policies of the United States Government for years.

President John Kennedy, according to his appointments secretary, Kenneth P. O'Donnell, "despised that kind of thing and never authorized it."

President Lyndon Johnson "shortly after taking office"—either in late 1963 or early 1964—forbade wiretapping by any Federal official or employee except in national security cases, according to his press secretary, Bill D. Moyers.

Every Attorney General from the Eisenhower Administration to the present has assured Congress that wiretapping is prohibited in non-security cases.

Despite these clear expressions of national policy, there is a growing body of evidence that the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover has for years been eavesdropping on American citizens in cases not even remotely connected with "national security."

Wiretaps and "bugs" were installed by the FBI in the homes and offices of various Las Vegas gamblers in 1962 and 1963. At least nine wiretaps or eavesdropping devices were arranged by the FBI in Kansas City between

1961 and 1965. A "listening device" was installed by the FBI in 1963 in the Washington hotel suite of Fred B. Black, Jr.

From the day it began the FBI's eavesdropping has been a risky business. It is a Federal crime to intercept without permission of the sender "any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person . . ."

Eavesdropping with devices unconnected to a telephone is likewise illegal if any form of trespass is involved, even such a trivial trespass as inserting a "bug" in a wall to "the depth of a thumbtack shaft."

SELF-DEFEATING TECHNIQUE

Furthermore, as Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach informed the Senate last year, eavesdropping and wiretapping are self-defeating techniques.

"Once you put a wiretap on or use an illegal device of any kind," said Katzenbach, "the possibilities of prosecution are gone. It is like a grant of immunity."

This is true whether or not the "national security" is involved. Thus, a suspected spy cannot be prosecuted if his telephone is tapped.

Nevertheless, Katzenbach and his predecessors have authorized wiretapping in such cases—50 to 100 a year—on the assumption that the information gained is more important than a conviction.

They have not been prosecuted for their apparent violation of Federal law because they have interpreted the law to mean that so long as information from wiretaps is not disclosed outside the Department no crime has been committed.

FBI Director Hoover is thoroughly familiar with the wiretapping and eavesdropping laws. "He would never engage in any of that without authority from the Attorney General," one of his former superiors has said.

Another Justice Department figure, knowledgeable in these affairs, has said much the same thing: "Anyone who claims that Hoover had no authority for what he did (in Las Vegas and in the 'bugging of Black's suite) is just not telling the truth. And anyone who says Bill Rogers, Bobby Kennedy and Nick Katzenbach didn't know what he was doing, doesn't know the facts. 'Whizzer' White (Associate Supreme Court Justice Byron White) knew a lot about this himself when he was working for BOBBY (as a Deputy Attorney General)."

RAPS MARSHALL

One government official in a position of responsibility has gone further. "It seems pretty clear to me," he said, "that the (Bobby) Baker case, the Black case, and the cases in Las Vegas are going to be lost because of (Solicitor General) Thurgood Marshall's memorandum to the Supreme Court (admitting that Black's hotel suite had been 'bugged')."

"Some of these cases will never come to trial. Deals will be made if they haven't already been made and Hoover is being set up to take the blame. This whole affair is not being handled like a law suit. It's being handled politically."

How much—if anything—the Justice Department knew about the FBI's eavesdropping and wiretapping activities is a closely held secret that will be aired, ultimately, before the Supreme Court.

For the moment, however, Hoover has turned down requests for an interview and has ordered his aides not to discuss the matter. Katzenbach takes the same position and has ordered his subordinates not to talk. They will not even reveal what, if any, regulations now are in effect governing wiretapping and eavesdropping by Government agencies.

Nonetheless, certain information has be-

come available. It has been obvious for several years to some attorneys in the Department, one official said that detailed reports from the FBI on various conversations could only have come as a result of wiretapping or eavesdropping. It is not clear whether these reports came to the personal attention of the Attorney General or his deputies.

BUGGING DISCUSSED

It has been ascertained that FBI officials met with Justice Department lawyers last year and discussed at length the use of "bugging" equipment in the Black case.

Solicitor General Marshall in his memorandum to the Supreme Court referred to a meeting last fall at which "attorneys in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice learned that a listening device had been installed in (Black's) suite. They then reviewed materials derived from that installation for the purpose of determining whether information obtained therefrom would prejudice a pending criminal investigation unrelated to (Black)."

There have been strong suggestions—but no official confirmation—that the "pending criminal investigation" Marshall referred to involved Bobby Baker and that the Justice Department was aware before Baker was indicted in January of this year that wiretapping was involved in his case.

This virtually has been admitted by William G. Hundley, the Justice Department's chief racketeering prosecutor, in a brief filed with the Federal District Court here earlier this month.

IDENTICAL BUGS

He said in his brief that wiretapping and eavesdropping issues raised in connection with the Baker indictment were identical to issues that had been raised long ago in Las Vegas in connection with the wiretapping of gambler Edward Levinson and others. The two cases, said Hundley, involved in the same "bugs," the same wiretaps, the same offices and the same bedrooms.

In that context, it was logical to assume that the Department had known for some time before the indictment that the wiretapping issue would be raised in the Baker case, for it had been aware of the Las Vegas incidents at least since 1964.

In the light of Katzenbach's statement that wiretapping is "just like a grant of immunity" the question has been raised within the Administration as to whether the Baker indictment was a meaningful step toward prosecution or a meaningless legal gesture.

"Once you admit wiretapping," one official has said, "it becomes almost impossible to prove that any other evidence you have is not tainted."

These are, of course, speculations that the courts will decide. They also may resolve the question of whether Hoover exceeded his authority.

LED TO BITTER DISPUTE

It is known that Marshall's memorandum to the Supreme Court infuriated Hoover and provoked a bitter dispute with Attorney General Katzenbach, who is said to have ended one discussion with the curt announcement: "That's the way it's going to be."

On June 13, the Supreme Court entered this area of dispute with an order to the Attorney General to give a complete accounting of the Black "bugging" incident, along with the names of those responsible and the legal authority on which they relied.

"Hoover," it has been reported, "will not wash this dirty linen in public. He's too loyal for that."

But it may be washed in public both here and in Las Vegas, where Hoover's agents are the target of a \$1 million law suit by Edward Levinson and the Fremont Hotel.

Whatever the outcome of these and related cases, they have raised profound issues in-

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Vietnam to Ottawa on Jan. 24. One of the cardinal conditions for peace talks stated in the letter was a demand for unconditional cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam.

HANOI-PEKING TIES IMPROVE

Hanoi's dismissal of the United States proposal may have been related to a recent improvement of relations between Hanoi and Peking according to analysts here. The Chinese Communists have been the most intransigent opponents of any move toward a negotiated settlement of the Vietnamese war. The Chinese have charged that the Soviet Union, Peking's foe, in the Communist ideological split, is in collusion with the United States to bring about a peace settlement unfavorable to the Vietcong.

Hanoi's relations with Peking had deteriorated because of North Vietnam's refusal to line up ideologically with Communist China against the Soviet Union. The North Vietnamese, dependent on both the Soviet Union and Communist China for military aid, have been reprimanded by Peking for pursuing an unacceptable compromising "centrist position" on ideological matters.

Analysts believe that these Peking-Hanoi tensions have been eased as a result of a secret meeting between President Ho Chi Minh and Chinese Communist leaders. He had been absent from his customary public activities between mid-May and last Friday, and is presumed to have gone to Peking during this period.

After the reported meeting, Hanoi has taken a number of actions that appeared to be designed to soothe the Chinese Communists.

The North Vietnamese Lao Dong (Communist) party issued a statement on June 10 denouncing "modern revisionism" as practiced by President Tito of Yugoslavia. The term "modern revisionism" is also applied by Communist China to the ideological position of the Soviet Union.

The North Vietnamese Communists' statement represented a reaffirmation of the militant ideological line, although it did not go so far as supporting Peking's charges that the Kremlin leadership is also guilty of "modern revisionism."

PEKING BLOCKAGE DENIED

Hanoi also published a statement yesterday that denounced what it described as malicious reports spread by Western news agencies to the effect that Peking had impeded railroad transit of Soviet military aid going to North Vietnam. Peking has repeatedly accused Moscow of inspiring reports that the Chinese Communists were delaying deliveries of Soviet aid.

There also has been a sudden increase in contacts between Peking and Hanoi.

Hanoi in the past has tried to assure its independence of action by using its ties with Moscow as a counterweight against Chinese influence. But now the North Vietnamese have apparently mollified the Chinese Communists by assuring them that Hanoi would continue to press the war in South Vietnam. In their contacts with foreigners, Hanoi leaders are said to behave as if they are convinced that they are winning the war against the United States.

"They act as if they are victims of their own propaganda," one diplomat said.

At the Prague Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist party, Le Duc Tho, a member of Hanoi's ruling Politburo, told delegates that Communist forces in South Vietnam had knocked out 40,000 United States troops including at least 14 battalions. He also said that 1,400 United States planes had been destroyed.

[In Washington, United States Defense Department sources labeled the claims of Le Duc Tho as "completely false." The correct figure on United States military dead as a result of combat in South Vietnam, they said, was 3,804 as reported by the Pentagon up to

and including June 11. United States aircraft destroyed in action in Vietnam up to June 2 totaled 374, they said. "No United States battalions have been rendered ineffective through personnel losses," an official spokesman said.]

SOURCES OF HOPE EMERGE

Le Duc Tho's remarks also revealed the origins of the apparent conviction in Hanoi that the anti-Communist war effort would collapse for political reasons.

Describing Buddhist ferment in South Vietnam, Le Duc Tho said "quarrels among the puppet army and the Administration have reached a degree of acuteness as has never been seen in the past 11 years." He said that the debate in the United States over Vietnam revealed that "our country enjoys the sympathy of the American people" while there are "mounting contradictions among U.S. ruling circles."

North Vietnamese leaders tell foreign visitors that they anticipate escalation of the war and United States bombing of the capital of Hanoi and the port city of Haiphong.

The system of air-raid shelters in the North Vietnamese capital has been extended. Thousands of one-man shelters—cement cylinders 2½ feet in diameter and about 5 feet in height—have been sunk into streets and vacant lots around the city. When an air raid signal sounds at the approach of occasional United States reconnaissance planes, members of the population take refuge in the cylinders and pull cement covers over their heads.

Many women and children have been sent out of the capital. Government offices and factories in some instances have been dispersed to surrounding villages.

THE 34TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE CHARTERING OF THE DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS ORGANIZATION

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, last Thursday, June 16, the Disabled American Veterans celebrated the 34th anniversary of their incorporation by the Congress. In those 34 years, and indeed for many years before 1932 as well, the DAV has ably championed the principle that those who sacrifice to defend our country in time of war shall not be forgotten in time of peace.

I regret that I was unable to be on the Senate floor at the time when many of my fellow Senators were joining in paying tribute to the accomplishments of this remarkable organization. I would like, therefore, to gratefully express my respect for the achievements of the DAV this afternoon. I have been in the Senate but a short time, but I remember the indispensable role which the Disabled American Veterans played last year in the bill we enacted increasing compensation for those with service-connected disabilities.

And since the DAV was formed on Christmas Day in 1919 by a group of 200 dedicated veterans of World War I, there have been countless examples of its efforts to secure for the disabled veteran his just share in the fruits of the society which his efforts did so much to protect. And the DAV does not just work for legislation; it also works very hard with individual veterans to help them secure employment or obtain full benefit of the rights which they have under our national law.

So I hope that the DAV will continue this good work. The late President Kennedy said about the Disabled American Veterans:

Your experience in the crucible of war has strengthened your sense of responsibility so that others may look to you with trust.

I share these sentiments, as do so many of my colleagues.

ASSISTANCE FOR LARGE FAMILIES

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. President, a statement on the problems of the large family in the United States by Dr. Paul J. Reiss, chairman of the department of sociology and anthropology at Fordham University was recently forwarded to me.

Dr. Reiss has made a number of interesting points concerning the needs of these families, and some of the aspects of family size that warrant further exploration.

It is important that every aspect of problems affecting American families be discussed and considered openly.

I ask unanimous consent that this statement be included in the Record and call it to the attention of my colleagues.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

THE LARGE FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES
(By Paul J. Reiss, Ph. D., Chairman, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Fordham University)

Several trends during this century especially since the Second World War, have resulted in a high proportion of American families having 2-4 children. It is the family of this size which is usually viewed as the typical American family. This situation, however, has caused us to overlook the continuing significance of the large family in American life.

How prevalent is the large family? To answer this question we first must recognize that families grow in size as children are born and then decrease in size as the children grow up and leave the home. The size of all families at any given time therefore does not accurately reflect the proportion which previously attained or will attain a large size at some time. However, we can consider those families in which the head of the family is 35-39, the age at which most families are at their full size. We discover in the reports of the 1960 census, that in 10.4% of these families there were five or more children. Looked at in another way, we find that of all families with children below the age of 18, there were 2,650,107 which had seven or more members (almost all, five or more children). These represented 10.3% of all families with children under 18. Thus it is clear that the large family continues to represent a significant proportion of American families. The significance of the large family is even greater, however, because of the large numbers of children who grow up in such families. In 1960 of all children under 18 living in families 19.3% were living in families with five or more children. Thus while large families represent perhaps 10% of the families in the United States, approximately one out of five children in the United States grows up in a large family.

We might logically ask next, where are these large families? It is quite true that the large family is found in higher proportions among the non-white population, the families of lower income and the families in rural areas. While this is so, it would be a serious error to stereotype large families as families exclusively of these segments of the

population. Approximately three fourths of the large families are white families and sixty percent are found in urban areas. The comparative economic status of the large family is revealed by a comparison of annual incomes among families with the head 35-44 years of age, between those where there were six or more members and those with fewer members. We find in this comparison a larger proportion of the large than small families (48% vs. 39%) had incomes below \$6,000. However, it should be recognized that a majority of the large families still had annual incomes above \$6,000. We can conclude from this that the large family is well represented in most segments of American society although it is disproportionately represented among the non-white, rural and low income families.

One of the most important characteristics of any social group is its size. It is a characteristic which almost always influences the social patterns and functioning of the group. Family size is, therefore, an important factor in the needs and problems of families. For this reason the need is apparent for more attention, study and action directed toward the distinctive problems of the large family which represents, as has been pointed out, a substantial portion of American families and the family context for an even more substantial proportion of American children. Research on the large family is needed which will reveal the distinctive patterns of family life in the large family, including the manner in which roles are allocated to parents and children, the way in which household tasks are handled and the influence of a large number of children on the relationship between the parents and between the mother and father and each of their children. In general the dynamics of family life in the large family needs to be explored.

There is hardly a more significant social fact in the lives of a married couple than the size of their family. We should thus expect that a large family has a relationship to the values, ideologies and attitudes of the parents, including social and religious attitudes. The relationship of a large family to the quality and characteristics of marital and familial satisfaction has yet to be understood beyond superficial impressions and accounts. Of particular interest and importance is the significance of a large family for the socialization of children. We should carefully examine the large family as a context within which children develop intellectual, occupational and social goals and attitudes. The behavioral patterns and values of children are bound to be in some way related to the fact of being socialized in a large family. There is some research on the topic but not much which goes beyond a comparison of children from different size families on some characteristic.

The economic needs and resources of the large family should be the subject of some rather intensive study. Of particular importance here is housing, since the large family has obvious requirements here. Housing for the large family is likely to have a great influence on the manner in which family life is led. In addition to housing are all the other items of family consumption for which the large family has particular needs. We need to examine the consumer economics of the large family in addition to those of the average American family and to be particularly concerned with the requirements for income maintenance in the large family. In general the welfare and health of the large family is a neglected subject of national importance and one about which we do not have adequate knowledge.

In addition to the need for research there is also a need for action programs directed to the problems of large families:

(a) Education: The large family with distinctive needs and problems should be the beneficiary of educational programs through

which the parents of large families may learn how better to cope with their problems whether social or economic. This could be done through pamphlets, reports, a magazine, or lectures explicitly designed for this segment of the population.

(b) Organization: There is a need to stimulate on the local level, gatherings or organizations through which parents of large families can meet with each other to exchange ideas and provide mutual support with respect to their common problems.

(c) A Voice: At the present time there is a need for an organization or group which will express the interests and needs of large families. The large families of the United States should have a voice in order that they be heard by government, industry and professional associations on those matters of special concern to large families whether it be the amount of the income tax deduction for children, the size of packages of consumer products, or the services to large families provided by medical professions or insurance companies.

The conclusion should not be hard to reach that there is need for research on large families which should be carried on by competent researchers with government or foundation support, as appropriate, and a need for an organization which can handle the educational and organizational needs for large families and to make known their interests when and where it is important to do so.

It could be pointed out that the goals of such research and action are not based on any position concerning the value of large vs. small families either for the individual or the society. Without taking any stand on questions of population policy, family planning or desirable family size, we can clearly recognize that it is consistent with our American value of individual freedom, for married couples to have the freedom to decide on the size of their families whether large or small. In any event, whether planned or not, there are substantial numbers of large families in the United States currently attempting to cope with their distinctive problems. Research and action is needed which will be directed toward the family life and needs of these American families.

CHANGES IN ECONOMICS PRACTICE IN COMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, early in May, Mr. Bernard D. Nossiter of the Washington Post Foreign Service, wrote a series of articles concerning the changes in economic practice and theory now sweeping Communist Eastern Europe.

One of the articles dealt with Yugoslavia and was titled "Yugoslavia Spurs Industry With Reforms in Economy." This particular column on Yugoslavia gave praise to what Tito was doing in Yugoslavia in promoting certain reforms in the economy of that nation.

When I read what Mr. Bernard D. Nossiter had to say about Yugoslavia, I was deeply skeptical about the soundness of his description of Tito's program and achievements.

In the Tuesday, May 24 issue of the Washington Post, a letter to the editor, written by Cyril A. Zebot, professor of economics of Georgetown University, is carried on the editorial page. Dr. Zebot points out conspicuous weaknesses in the analysis made by Mr. Nossiter in the latter's description of the alleged achievements of Tito.

The Members of the Senate of the United States of course are interested in learning what the true political and economic situation is in Titoland. Illuminating information is contained in the recitation of facts made by Prof. Cyril A. Zebot to the editor of the Washington Post. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of Dr. Zebot's letter be printed in the Record along with the pertinent articles to which I have referred.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, May 11, 1966]

BELGRADE SEEKS INVESTORS' FAITH

(By Bernard D. Nossiter)

(NOTE.—This is the first of a series of articles by The Washington Post's economic correspondent in Europe on the changes in economic practice and theory now sweeping Communist Eastern Europe.)

BELGRADE.—In a cavernous government building in New Belgrade, a leading architect of Yugoslavia's daring economic experiment leans forward and earnestly talks to a visitor in a language any businessman would recognize. He says, in effect:

"We are now trying to create a climate of confidence so that our enterprises will invest in each other. The trouble is that our parliament is all too ready to expropriate."

On the other bank of the Sava River, in a turn-of-the-century brownstone, a high ranking planner says:

"We are only mapping the broad indicators here now. I won't be upset if the actual structure of the economy differs from the indications in our plan."

Such freewheeling talk is now common here. This is the most open and venturesome of the countries calling themselves Socialists. Reform and talk of reform are now going on all over Eastern Europe, but it is going furthest and fastest in Yugoslavia.

All through this region, the economic problem is essentially the same: how can a society without private ownership and free markets provide a rational allocation of resources, one that takes into account real economic costs?

In one form or another, these countries are coming up with similar answers: reduce arbitrary directives from the top, encourage managerial discretion and rely—as much as is politically possible—on market forces. In effect, firms are being rewarded for maximizing their profits, for saving on materials and labor and expanding their sales. To be sure, "profit" is an ideologically suspect word so it is transmuted into euphemisms, "surplus" in Yugoslavia or "gross income" in Czechoslovakia.

One crucial feature remains unchanged throughout Eastern Europe. Productive means are owned by the State, not individuals. But the curve of change is bending so rapidly in Yugoslavia that even the concept of public ownership is becoming transformed in the drive to make capital more mobile.

Boris Kraiger, vice president of the Federal Executive Council and the single most important man concerned with economic affairs here, says:

"We are now working on a set of regulations so that all the resources created by an enterprise—apart from taxes—cannot be alienated in any way."

This comes perilously close to saying that workers and managers in an enterprise shall enjoy a joint ownership right in their firm's production.

Ideological purity has long since been abandoned here. "If it works, it's good," a key legislator says. Indeed, throughout this capital, there is a sense of zest, adventure and vitality. It is reflected in the lively

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

June 22, 1966

I welcome this opportunity to mention several things that lie close to the hearts of your parents, the college and all of us who have an interest in your success as citizens and leaders of the future.

First, there is the pride that we all share in the fine achievements of the Students of Gallaudet College.

Second, is the gratitude that all of us have to your faculty and Gallaudet staff for their devoted services since the beginning of your experience here.

Third, I want to use this opportunity to urge all of you to work for your school and for all organizations for the deaf. Now is the time to turn your attention to the *World of the Adult Deaf*. A new frontier of services to and with the deaf is pending everywhere. The responsibility is never-ending. Help those of us who are trying to rise to this responsibility and together we will provide the resources for programs of effective social action for all the handicapped including the deaf.

This year, as in almost 100 years past, Gallaudet is sending you, outstanding young men and women, into responsible positions across our Nation. In this age of automation and advanced technology, new demands will be made upon you. I challenge you to meet the demands of other deaf youth, to utilize to the fullest the opportunities available for educating the deaf, to become leaders and initiators in this important area. While cherishing and benefiting from your past educational experiences here, I implore you to heed the inscription on the Chapel Tower Clock and to look upon it as a promise for your future. I congratulate you for your past successes, rewarded here this morning, and challenge you not to turn back, but to go forward and continue your accomplishments—so that you, other deaf persons, and all society may benefit.

An American Hero Answers the Antipatriots

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. JAMES D. MARTIN

OF ALABAMA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 22, 1966

Mr. MARTIN of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, in spite of the faint hearts who are willing to sell their country short, the freedom of future generation of Americans is still in the hands of proud men who are unafraid to fight and die for their country.

I am proud of the many sons of Alabama who are today fighting in Vietnam. I regret that there are so many who are safe at home, even occupying places of importance in America, who seem more concerned with appeasing the enemy than in supporting the cause of freedom for which our sons, brothers, fathers, and husbands are fighting.

Even though the sons of Alabama and the South have been ridiculed, mocked, and slandered by demonstrators, peace-nicks, unwashed rabble, and officials of the Johnson administration, they have not failed when their country called. This is in contrast to some of the coddled darlings of the administration.

Under permission to extend my remarks in the Record I would like to include the following letter to the editor

of the Birmingham News written at the frontline of freedom in Vietnam by L. Cpl. Chester C. Green, who proudly wears the uniform and upholds the great traditions of the U.S. Marines.

The letter follows:

MARINE WILL WEAR UNIFORM PROUDLY

I want to try and square the American fighting man with the college kids and a few of our senior citizens who are sitting back there where it is safe for them to run their fat mouths: Have you people forgotten why you are able to sit there and make with the big talk?

It is because my grandfather, your grandfather, my father, your father went off to some distant land to fight for what is right and to keep the U.S. free from communism.

I know you are thinking, "How are we keeping communism out of America?"

Well, it is very simple. You see, if we stand by and let our allied countries become overrun with communism, before you know it the whole world would become ruled by the Commies and then when they were ready to take over America, who could we turn to for support against the Communists? That is easy. The answer: No one, because we would have stood by and watched our allies be overrun by the Communists and there would be no more allied countries because they would be ruled by the Communists.

We are committed to this fight in Viet Nam because South Viet Nam is one of our allies and they asked for our help so they can be free the same as you are. If we turned our back on them and did not show that we do not want communism, then communism would spread throughout.

That is why you should not be protesting against the American troops in Viet Nam. It is because of us and our forefathers that you are safe from Communist rule. So please don't make it any harder on us than it already is.

It sure tears down one's morale when he picks up a newspaper and reads: "Youth Protesting Viet Nam Policy," or "Youth Burns Draft Card." If you are too scared to come over here and fight for our country, we don't want you over here anyway. You would get someone killed.

I am a resident of Birmingham and I will be coming home soon. I intend to wear my uniform proudly for what I have done for my country.

L. Cpl. CHESTER C. GREEN,
2101655, "L" Co., 3rd Bn., 3rd Mar. 3rd
Marine Division (Rein), FMF Marine
No. 23, Care FPO San Francisco, Calif.
96601.

Is United States Pleading Viet Case on Wrong Grounds?

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. JOHN D. DINGELL

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 22, 1966

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to permission granted, I insert into the Appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD an excellent editorial appearing in the Washington, D.C., Evening Star on Monday, June 13, 1966 by Howard K. Smith entitled "Is United States Pleading Viet Case on Wrong Grounds?"

A point which critics of the President should carefully consider is raised.

While the United States is pressing for free and open elections in the south, Ho Chi Minh, in North Vietnam, has never dared to submit his regime to a free election, nor would he do so.

More importantly, the Communist regime of the north and its puppets, the Vietcong, both oppose the free elective process at home and in the south and have announced that there will be no Vietcong participation in that free election in the south.

The article follows:

IS UNITED STATES PLEADING VIET CASE ON WRONG GROUNDS?

(By Howard K. Smith)

Every successive opinion poll shows that our appetite for resisting in Viet Nam is declining, and that President Johnson's stock with the voters is going the same way.

One cannot help thinking that the administration is not putting its case to the American people in proper terms. Of several faults, one is outstanding: The President and Secretary of State Dean Rusk and their colleagues almost always justify our effort in Southeast Asia on legal or moral grounds. The fact is that the struggle there is essentially and overwhelmingly a power struggle which we would probably have to undertake regardless of law or morality.

This is not to agree with the host of guilt-ridden critics who believe our moral case is bad. Compared with our foe's case, it is downright good. Ho Chi Minh has never dared submit his regime to a free election such as we are pressing for under U.N. inspection in the south.

His instrument of power has been terrorism. His "reforms" left the average North Vietnamese peasant considerably worse off than the average South Vietnamese peasant—until Ho made life in the south impossible by the murder of nearly all local officials and the systematic intimidation of the rest. It is an eloquent fact that though war-weary South Vietnamese dissent or riot or desert the forces, none go over to the Viet Cong.

But the real and relevant explanation of why we are fighting is that this is a power struggle the loss of which would bring consequences awful to contemplate.

To make the point, consider what would happen, first if they, then if we, prevail.

A Communist success, following an American withdrawal, would be an "openended" result. It would sharpen their appetite and desperately weaken the resistance of neighbors waiting to be consumed. It would justify the basic motivation of their ideology which is blind faith in a world interpretation that promises universal dominion at the end of the road.

The "domino theory is much discredited in conversation. But the facts of life are these: Laos and Cambodia are shot through with guerrilla forces trained where those now in South Viet Nam were trained. Our AID officials in Thailand are watching a guerrilla minority, trained in the same place, beginning to accumulate power by methods of pure terror in northeast Thailand.

China has made public the intention of adding Thailand to her bloc, and her actions over many years make clear her ultimate design of forcing the disintegration of India, the only possible counter-force to China south of Japan.

In short, a Communist success would be a destabilizing event; it would be bound to lead to further and worse conflicts.

A success for our side, on the other hand, would be a stabilizing result. As in Europe, we seek no territorial gain. Our aim is to find a line and establish the principle that we will not cross it to their detriment if they will not cross it either.

In the age of nuclear weapons it is a paramount mission to establish this principle that borders may not be changed by force in Asia—just as we established it in Europe. With China rapidly becoming a nuclear power, we dare not relinquish the effort now by curtailing our force or withdrawing it.

In his recent history of our times, Prof. Carroll Quigley makes the point that Germany, Italy and Japan gained immensely more by losing to us in World War II than they could have possibly have gained by winning. Had they won, their governments, filled with the seeds of their own degeneration, would have been stimulated to infinite acquisition, with consequent national impoverishment and eventual annihilation by the United States. As it is, they have stabilized, become progressive, democratic and prosperous societies.

Very much the same can be said about the Communist nations of Asia. If they win in Viet Nam, they will move on indefinitely to extend their sway. At some point the United States would be forced to intervene again, this time with the support of the opinion polls of a frightened public that at last would see the real nature of the struggle. A much bloodier war would result.

South Viet Nam is the right place and this is the right time to make a stand.

Sertoma International

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. BERNARD F. GRABOWSKI

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 14, 1966

Mr. GRABOWSKI. Mr. Speaker, I wish to join the Vice President of the United States, the Honorable HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, in commending Sertoma International, the famed Service to Mankind organization, for 54 years of unselfish service to advance and better the lot of the afflicted and underprivileged. Delegates from 500 Sertoma Clubs throughout the United States, in Canada, Mexico, and Puerto Rico, many of them with their wives and children, are meeting this week at the Sheraton Park Hotel in their annual convention.

In a message to the convention, directed to International President H. A. Zethren of Lincoln, Nebr., the Vice President said:

Please convey my greetings to the convention of Sertoma International. My special congratulations to Mr. Glenn M. Young, who deservedly receives your 1966 International Service to Mankind Award. His type of dedicated labor with young Scouts is in Sertoma's and all America's finest traditions. Now, more than ever before, we do need Sertoma's spirit of service to mankind—helping the less fortunate, serving as a beacon for civic progress, building community institutions.

While unfortunately I cannot be with you in person, please know that I am wishing for you the best convention ever. May Sertoma continue to flourish in advancing the ideals we as a Nation cherish.

Glenn Young, International Service to Mankind winner, served Scouting in the Duluth, Minn., area from 1923 to 1955 in every conceivable "volunteer" position—committeeman, first aid instructor and merit badge counsellor for Boy Scouts,

Girl Scouts, and Cub Scouts, a Scoutmaster and an active member of the Duluth Area Scouting Extension Committee. Since "retiring" in 1955, Young has built 44 Scout troops in the Tampa, Fla., area singlehandedly, and his immediate goal is 50 Scout troops.

Louis W. Parker: On Opportunity, Free Enterprise, and Philanthropy

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. PAUL G. ROGERS

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 8, 1966

Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, there is too little mention these days of individual initiative and accomplishment. To be sure, our society has greatly benefited from the group efforts of science, industry, labor, and Government in many fields. Yet, it is still the individual, striving for accomplishment, who contributes greatly to our success and well-being.

It was my very great pleasure to hear such a man last week. The occasion was the annual dinner of the Fort Lauderdale, Fla., Chamber of Commerce. The chamber honored a local resident who had been most generous to the community, and the recipient of this honor responded with a few remarks on success, money, and the American free enterprise system. Seldom do we hear this message today, and seldom as eloquently as this gentleman stated it. It was a moving experience and I regret that it is not possible for each Member of the Congress to hear it personally, but I do take pleasure in including it in the Appendix of the Record to enrich us all with this special wisdom:

ADDRESS BY LOUIS W. PARKER

Members, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, I want to express my thanks to the members of the Greater Fort Lauderdale Chamber of Commerce for honoring me today. I am truly grateful.

For the past two months I have been receiving various honors from the City and Nova University. I also received a great number of letters from the good citizens of Fort Lauderdale, thanking me for my philanthropic activities.

I wish to point out however that I am only supplying the money and without the cooperation of the City government, the trustees of Nova University, as well as numerous other people who serve without pay, my efforts would be unsuccessful.

I look upon money as the material from which intelligent and well meaning people can build many things. But the value of these things depends mainly on the proper motivation and knowledge of the people using the money. John D. Rockefeller said that his most important function was to pick the right man for the job. I found out the truth of his philosophy.

As many of you may have heard, I received my money as royalties on various inventions. I mention this because I found that there are a good many people who seem to think that when a man becomes wealthy he must get the money in some unethical manner. The usual charge is that he underpaid his

workers and pocketed the money that should really be theirs.

Those who make such charges have little knowledge of the operation of business. Even the best managed corporations can show a net profit of only about four percent after taxes. It happens that someone finds a gold mine or an oil well but this is so rare that no conclusion can be drawn from it.

It is possible only with long years of hard work and intelligence to create something new and useful for society and this sometimes brings a return which seems out of proportion to the effort exerted.

The affluence of our society is partly the result of such creations and for this reason it considers them precious and permits a substantial financial return for it.

In a country such as ours where technical advances are considered normal and where the government permits free enterprise to operate, anyone has a chance to amass a moderate size fortune. Those who don't usually can only blame themselves.

I was not born in this country. I am sure you never would have guessed if I hadn't told you. When I came here at the age of seventeen I knew only two words in English, "umbrella" and "handkerchief." You'd be surprised how difficult it is to hold an intelligent conversation using only those two words.

I mention this only to show that even an immigrant coming here as an adult and not knowing the language may achieve success in a wonderful country as the United States.

But what is success? Becoming a multimillionaire? I don't think so. To me success is the achievement of happy living. A large sum of money not only is unnecessary but it very often has an adverse effect.

For myself I have decided that after having accumulated enough wealth for my family and myself to live in quiet security I will use the remaining money to help others. For having more money than that would only be surplus and could not make us happier. As a child I was taught that when I give you something you need more than I do, I am not really giving. But if I give you something I need more than you do, that's giving. So far I gave nothing I needed.

There are many people in Broward County with much more money than I have, I sincerely hope that my actions and my philosophy may serve to awaken them to the fact that they can't take it with them.

If they realized this Fort Lauderdale would come a better place in which to live.

Thank you.

Good American Awards, 1962-65

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. BARRATT O'HARA

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 1, 1966

Mr. O'HARA of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, by unanimous consent I am extending my remarks to include the names of the previous recipients of the Good American Awards of the Committee of 100, as follows:

The recipients of the Good American Award for 1962 were:

Joseph L. Block, Chairman, Inland Steel Company; Monsignor Daniel M. Cantwell, Chaplain, Catholic Interracial Council of Chicago; The Rev. Dr. Archibald J. Carey, Jr., Pastor, Quinn Chapel AME Church; Dr. Stella L. Counselbaum, Executive Secretary,

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Illinois Commission on Human Rights in Higher Education; The Honorable Richard J. Daley, Mayor, City of Chicago; Mrs. Vernona Derr, Purchasing Agent, Follett Publishing Company; The Honorable EVERETT M. DIRKSEN, Minority Leader, United States Senate; Dr. Maurice X. Donohue, The Director, The University College, The University of Chicago; The Honorable PAUL H. DOUGLAS, United States Senator from Illinois; Joel Goldblatt, President, Goldblatt Bros., Inc.; the late Myron Goldsmith, President, Lag Drug Company, Inc.; Hilton E. Hanna, Executive Assistant, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America; Andrew T. Hatcher, former Associate Press Secretary, The White House; Hugh Hefner, Publisher, Playboy Magazine; Dr. Lois L. Higgins, former Director, Illinois Crime Prevention Bureau; Raymond M. Hillard, Director, Cook County Department of Public Aid; Conrad N. Hilton, President, Hilton Hotels Corporation; Dr. Percy L. Julian, President, The Julian Laboratories, Inc.; The Honorable Otto Kerner, Governor, State of Illinois; Ferd Kramer, President, Draper and Kramer, Inc.; Irv Kupcinet, Columnist, Chicago Sun-Times, Moderator, KUP's Show, ABC; Richard P. Larsen, President, South Side Bank & Trust Company.

Stuart List, Publisher, Chicago's American; C. V. Martin, President, Carson Pirie Scott & Company; Remick McDowell, Chairman, The Peoples Gas Light & Coke Company; C. E. McKittrick, Assistant to the Publisher, Chicago Tribune; Louis E. Martin, Deputy Chairman, Democratic National Committee; The Honorable James B. Parsons, Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois; the late Holman D. Pettibone, Former Chairman, Chicago Title & Trust Company; Dr. Annabel Carey Prescott, Educator and Lecturer in Sociology; Frank Reynolds, News Commentator, WBBM-TV, CBS News; Mrs. Charlemae Rollins, Children's Librarian, The Chicago Public Library; A. Abbot Rosen, Director, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith; Norman Ross, News Analyst, ABC, Chicago, Ross-McElroy Productions, Inc.; Arthur Rubloff, Chairman, Arthur Rubloff & Company; Dr. T. Manuel Smith, Physician-Surgeon; J. C. Staehle, Vice President, Aldens, Inc.; Russ Stewart, Executive Vice President, Chicago Sun-Times and Chicago Daily News; Miss Harriet E. White, Director of Community Relations, The National Conference of Christians and Jews; The Honorable Hubert L. Will, Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois; Leroy Winbush, President, Winbush Associates, Inc.

The recipients of the Good American Award for 1963 were:

The Honorable Jacob M. Arvey, Democratic National Committeeman, State of Illinois; J. Paul Austin, President, The Coca-Cola Company; Mrs. Sarah Patton Boyle, Author, "The Desegregated Heart"; the late Charles F. Carpenter, Secretary of State, State of Illinois; George S. Cobb, President, Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Chicago; David L. Daniel, Assistant Director, Public Assistance Division, Cook County Department of Public Aid; Thomas L. Davis, Vice President and General Manager, Radio Station WAAF, Chicago; John D. deButts, President, Illinois Bell Telephone Company; John Doremus, WMAQ-Radio, WNBQ-TV, Chicago, National Broadcasting Company, Inc.; The Honorable Robert Jerome Dunne, Judge, Probate Court of Cook County, Illinois; Mrs. Marjorie L. Everett, Executive Vice President, Arlington Park and Washington Park Jockey Clubs; Dr. Arthur G. Falls, Physician and Surgeon; Marshall Field, Jr., Publisher, Chicago Sun-Times and Chicago Daily News; Paul C. Fisher, President, Fisher Pen Company; Peter FitzPatrick, Attorney at Law; Dwight W. Follett, President; Follett Publishing Company; Henry Ford, II., Chairman of The Board, The Ford Motor

Company; Mrs. Irene McCoy Gaines, Chairman, Women's Auxiliary, American Negro Emancipation Centennial Authority; Dr. Francis J. Gerty, Director, Department of Mental Health, State of Illinois; Miss Althea Gibson, Community Relations Representative, Ward Baking Company; Willard Gidwitz, President, Helene Curtis Industries, Inc.; Patrick E. Gorman, International Secretary-Treasurer, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America; Dick Gregory, Comedian; Mrs. Eloise B. Johnson, Proprietor, Eloise Exclusive Millinery, Chicago; The Honorable Constantine N. Kangles, Master in Chancery, Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois; The Honorable ROBERT F. KENNEDY, U.S. Attorney General.

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., President, Southern Christian Leadership Conference; the late David Saul Klafier, Architect; The Honorable Marshall Korshak, Trustee, The Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago; Jerome F. Kutak, President, Guarantee Reserve Life Insurance Company of Hammond, Indiana; Edward C. Logelin, Vice President, United States Steel Corporation; Cecil J. North, President, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; William L. McFetridge, President, Marina City Building Corporation and Chicago Flat Janitors Union; Patrick L. O'Malley, President, Automatic Canteen Company of America; Ignatius A. O'Shaughnessy, President, Globe Oil Refining Company; William E. Payne, Director of Special Markets, Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers, Inc.; The Honorable ROMAN C. PUCINSKI, Member of the United States Congress; Robert F. Quain, Senior Vice President, Hilton Hotels; Sterling C. Quinlan, Vice President, American Broadcasting Company; Jackie Robinson, Vice President, Chock Full O'Nuts, New York City; The Honorable Carl T. Rowan, U.S. Ambassador to Finland; Mrs. L. S. Schwartz, Director, Central Region, The Advertising Council, Inc.; Nathan H. Schwartz, Attorney at Law; Ramon S. Scruggs, Public Relations Manager, American Telephone and Telegraph Company; Charles F. Sebastian, President, Radio Station WTAQ, LaGrange, Illinois; The Most Reverend Bernard J. Sheil, Auxiliary Archbishop, Chicago Roman Catholic Archdiocese; The Honorable Robert Sargent Shriver, Jr., Director, The Peace Corps; Mandel Siegel, President, Kenwood Chamber of Commerce; The Honorable Fred W. Slater, Judge, Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois; The Honorable Otis M. Smith, Justice of The Supreme Court of Michigan; Wendell Smith, Newscaster, WBBM-TV-CBS-Chicago; Samuel B. Stratton, Lecturer on Negro History, University of Chicago; Ed Sullivan, Master of Ceremonies, The Ed Sullivan Show; Charles R. Swibel, President, Marina City Management Corporation; The Honorable Orlando W. Wilson, Superintendent of Police, City of Chicago; J. Howard Wood, Publisher, Chicago Tribune.

The recipients of the Good American Award for 1964 were:

Sherman Abrams, President, Al Abrams Pontiac, Inc.; Douglas B. Anderson, Illinois Representative for Senator PAUL H. DOUGLAS; FRANK ANUNZIO, President, Lake Personnel Service; Mrs. Etta Moten Barnett, Chicago Civic Leader; George Beslow, President, Beslow Associates; John S. Boyle, Chief Judge, Circuit Court of Cook County; Gwendolyn Brooks, Pulitzer Prize Winning Poetess; Deton J. Brooks, Executive Director, Chicago Committee on Urban Opportunity; John E. Cullerton, Director of Labor, State of Illinois; Dr. W. N. Daniel, Pastor, Antioch Missionary Baptist Church; Morris R. DeWoskin, President, Morris R. DeWoskin and Company; Earl B. Dickerson, President, Supreme Life Insurance Company of America; Lawrence S. Fanning, Executive Editor, Chicago Daily News; Hyman Feldman, Judge, Municipal Court of Chicago; Dr. Roy R. Grinker, Michael Reese Hospital; Vernon Herndon,

Vice President, Hilton Hotels Corporation; Fred A. Hertwig, Superintendent, Cook County Hospital; Fred Jasper, President, Jasper's Reports; Theodore A. Jones, Senior Vice President, Supreme Life Insurance Company of America; James H. Kemp, President, Building Service Employees International Union, Local 189; Dr. Theodore K. Lawless, Dermatologist; Mrs. Alfred Lowenthal; Gordon McLendon, President, McLendon Corporation, Dallas, Texas; the late Oscar Mayer, former Chairman, Oscar Mayer and Company; Donald Peters, President, Warehouse and Mail Order Employees Union, Local 743; Alvin E. Rose, Executive Director, Chicago Housing Authority; E. H. Russell, McCloskey & Company, Advertising; Max S. Steiner, President, Clifford Peterson Tool Company; Mrs. Grace Lee Stevens, Vice President, Illinois Association of Club Women and Girls; William Sylvester White, Director, Department of Registration and Education, State of Illinois.

The recipients of the Good American Award for 1965 were:

The Honorable Vito Marzullo, Chairman, Committee on Aviation, City Council of Chicago; Alonzo V. Mercer, Regional Supervisor, Community Service for the Visually Handicapped, State of Illinois; The Honorable Ralph H. Metcalfe, Chairman, Committee on Building and Zoning, City Council of Chicago; The Honorable Abner J. Mikva, Illinois State Representative; Mrs. Frauline Miller, Teacher, Englewood High School; Dr. Paul Mundy, Chairman, Department of Sociology, Loyola University; The Honorable Vel Phillips, Member, City Council of Milwaukee; Harold E. Rainville, Special Assistant to The Honorable Everett M. Dirksen, Minority Leader, United States Senate; Harvey C. Russell, Vice President Special Markets, Pepsi-Cola Company; Sig Sakowicz, Sig Sakowicz Enterprises; Norman J. Schlossman, Chairman, Chicago Executive Committee, Midwest Regional Office, Anti-Defamation League, B'nai Brith; Oscar E. Shabat, Dean, Wright Junior College; Dr. Queen Esther Shootes, Dean, School of Home Economics and Food Administration, Tuskegee Institute, Tuskegee, Alabama; Dr. J. Andrew Simmons, Executive Director, Hillcrest Center for Children, Bedford Hills, New York; The Honorable Seymour Simon, President, Cook County Board of Commissioners; Mrs. Vivian T. Sosin, Coordinator, The Special Training Programs, Cook County Department of Public Aid; Mrs. Daisy H. Stocking, Daytona Beach, Florida; the Honorable Hobart Taylor, Executive Vice Chairman, President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity; The Honorable Robert C. Weaver, Administrator, Housing and Home Finance Agency; Robert P. Williford, President, Hilton Hotels Corporation; The Honorable Sidney R. Yates, United States Congressman from Illinois; Lloyd E. Yoder, Vice President, National Broadcasting Company. Posthumous Award presented to The Reverend James J. Reeb, Unitarian Minister.

Easing Foreign Aid Loan Terms

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. ROY H. MCVICKER

OF COLORADO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 22, 1966

Mr. MCVICKER. Mr. Speaker, the June issue of Fortune magazine, reporting on trade and investment overseas, dramatizes the crippling effects of high interest rates attached to foreign aid loans to the poorer nations of the world.

June 22, 1966

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400080007-3

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the power of the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe.

Hardly a gift for Poland's Christians on the 1,000th anniversary of their conversion.

Vietnam: Land of Medical Need

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. RICHARD (DICK) ICHORD

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 22, 1966

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Speaker, doctors and saints have been closely allied many times in literature and song, and this synonymy, rather than antithesis, is close to reality in many instances.

The great Greek doctor, called the Father of Medicine, Hippocrates, envisioned the roll of the doctor in the 20th century and for all time. The physician's oath, which Hippocrates drafted some time during his life—from 460 to 377 B.C.—contained these words:

I will keep pure and holy both my life and my art. * * * Now if I carry out this oath, and break it not, may I gain forever reputation among men for my life and my art.

This is the oath of medical men, those dedicated to the cause and to their profession. Duty calls these dedicated servants of men at any hour and at any time and at any age, and they respond with loyalty to that oath.

A case in point is Dr. William J. Shaw, Sr., of Fayette, Mo. Dr. Shaw responded to the calls of duty during a long and faithful practice of medicine in Missouri. He retired in March 1965 at the age of 71 to enjoy a leisure life full of satisfactions and personal achievements. Duty called once more, however, and he responded to the President's appeal to the American Medical Association for volunteer physicians to serve the civilian populace in South Vietnam, the land of medical needs. At the age of 72, when most people are content to enjoy the comforts of retirement, Dr. Shaw abandoned his retirement in response to the President's call and worked for 2 months in South Vietnam. Again, Dr. Shaw heeded the words of Hippocrates:

Sometimes give your services for nothing, calling to mind a previous benefaction or present satisfaction. * * * For where there is love of man, there is also love of the art. For some patients, though conscious that their condition is perilous, recover their health simply through their contentment with the goodness of the physician.

Dr. Shaw has recounted his general impressions of the experience in the February 1966 issue of Missouri Medicine, the official publication of the Missouri State Medical Association.

Mr. Speaker, I stand in tribute to the unselfish devotion of Dr. Shaw, a man whose dedication conforms to the highest traditions of his country and of his profession dictated by Hippocrates more than 2,000 years ago. At this point in the Record, I should like to have Dr. Shaw's article from Missouri Medicine reprinted for the benefit of all my colleagues:

VIETNAM: LAND OF MEDICAL NEED

(By William J. Shaw, Sr., M.D.)

When President Johnson requested help from the medical profession of the U. S. in caring for civilians in Viet Nam—where doctors are in radically short supply—he initiated a program which developed many ramifications.

Physicians from other countries were already in Viet Nam. Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Korea, Italy and others had sent groups of doctors. Most of these were functioning as surgical teams. The request from the President in July of last year called for general surgeons, orthopedic surgeons and general practitioners to participate in a program to be designated as *Project Viet Nam*. Through this project American physician volunteers would go to Viet Nam on a rotation basis to assist in the medical care of civilians in that country. The need was obvious. In a country with a population of more than 17-million people, there were approximately 700 licensed Vietnamese physicians, 500 of whom were serving in the armed forces.

As the first step in the new program, volunteer physicians from the U. S. would be assigned to the four province hospitals on the east coast of Viet Nam. They would work with Vietnamese medical personnel and the various visiting surgical teams at those hospitals, where the supply of civilian physicians was rapidly diminishing as the war accelerated. The Americans would serve under the supervision of the surgical team leaders who had been in these hospitals for some time prior to the organization of *Project Viet Nam*. It must be understood that these hospitals not only serve the civilian population, with the normal health problems of a heavily populated country where primitive conditions prevail in many areas, but also provide care for civilian casualties of the war.

After briefings in Washington, D.C. and Saigon, the first group of five general practitioners were assigned to the Vietnamese province hospitals at Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, Bien Hoa and two to Da Nang. There was no available method for the five new doctors to maintain contact with each other or to compare problems until the two-month tour had ended and the group re-met at Saigon to return to their homes. Each doctor had been busy and could well answer questions relative to his own area, but the provinces differed as much in their respective needs as medical training programs do in the States.

All of the general practitioners were assigned to province hospitals in areas quite similar in proximity to the active combat zones. U.S. casualties in the area were treated by American service physicians and hospitals, but civilian casualties from war activities were treated usually in the nearest province hospital. Unquestionably, each of the first quintet of general practitioners sent over by *Project Viet Nam* will have different reports due to the different needs of the civilians and the Viet Nam army casualties in their individual areas. An attempt will be made here to relate the experiences of one of these, the general practitioner sent to the hospital at Nha Trang, a 400-bed facility.

The morning this G.P. arrived at the assigned location he was introduced to the members of the surgical team who were responsible for surgical admissions. The team consisted of: a public health surgeon, the leader of the surgical team; an assistant surgeon; an orthopedic surgeon (who arrived about ten days later); four American nurses under United States Operations Mission; one nurse anesthetist; one laboratory technician; and a chief nurse advisor. An administrator for the hospital had been lent by the army, and a retired naval hospital corpsman served as X-ray technician. To this group three native interpreters were added by USOM.

In addition to the Province Medical Chief (Dr. Luc) the civilian members of the hospital's professional staff included one pediatrician, one internist and a large group of excellent para-medical personnel, all of whom were assigned to the surgical team. Also included was the department of obstetrics, under the supervision of an excellently trained Vietnamese female obstetrician, and a team of native nurses. This department, though independent, was naturally in close contact with the surgical team. All nurses, except those on the surgical team, were Vietnamese-trained. As in all groups, some of the nurses were excellently trained and some were still in the embryonic stages of becoming registered nurses.

A brief description of the Nha Trang Province hospital and its facilities may be of some interest. The grounds cover a rather large area on which are located the hospital and auxiliary buildings. Part of the original building has been remodeled, and much of the complex is still in the construction stage. The hospital proper consists of a long, centrally located building with a wing on each end of the main structure. This building houses one emergency room, routine offices, the entire surgical suite, X-ray facilities, clinical laboratories, one recovery room (air conditioned) and the surgical ward.

The surgical ward accommodates 42 surgical patients, but 21 beds are available for convalescent surgical patients in a quonset hut 100 yards from the main building. A few hospital beds are available in the surgical ward. The large majority of beds are padded iron cots, which patients prefer to beds with American mattresses. The surgical suite includes two well-planned operating rooms, air conditioned and equipped with necessary facilities for local or general anesthesia. Water is available for sterilizing instruments and surgical cleaning of wounds.

One new wing has been constructed as a surgical ward but has not yet been utilized. Another new wing now in use has 34 beds and is utilized as an obstetrical ward. This includes delivery and operative sections. A new building, expected to be completed shortly, will accommodate 70 obstetrical patients.

The medical department is housed in two buildings removed from the main building approximately 100 yards. This unit has 61 patient beds (cots) in use, but will also have a new building with 70 additional beds when the construction is completed.

The pediatrics ward is a new two-story building about the same distance from the main building as the medical ward and surgical convalescent hut. Only the lower floor, with a capacity of 49 beds, is being utilized at present. Several of these are restricted to isolation cases which necessitates some of the rooms caring for six to eight patients. Modern bath rooms have been built in each end of the ward, but lack of water prevents their use.

There are a number of other buildings found on the hospital grounds. The administrative building includes the offices of the province Medical Chief and his administrative assistants. The dental office and the hospital pharmacy are housed in another building. On one corner of the grounds an older building is used daily for out-patient medical and pediatric clinics. The morgue is a small building between the outpatient clinic and the pediatric ward. The kitchen is a small, poorly covered area near the surgical hut. The laundry consists of one area, without roof, near an open well adjacent to the kitchen. At times the laundry is enlarged to include clothes lines stretched across the front porch of the hospital proper or hung on any fence within the hospital area. Open wells are the only available water supply for the hospital. However, facilities to furnish water to the hospital wards are included in the new construction.

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400080007-3

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

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On the fourth day after his arrival at Nha Trang, the G.P. received a new assignment at the hospital. He was relieved from duties on the surgical team and assigned to the pediatric department to supplant the Viet Nam pediatrician who was transferred to Saigon for two months. With the consent and cooperation of the Province Medical Chief and the leader of the surgical team, the dubious G.P. was placed in charge of the pediatric ward with 49 beds and 56 patients and a clinic which treated some 30 patients each day. Night calls included alternating with the doctor on medicine. The pediatric department consisted of: six regular nurses (none of whom spoke English); the new American "pediatrician" (who did not speak the Vietnamese language); a number of nursing students and civilian maids (who were similarly non-bilingual); and an interpreter who was attached to the department temporarily to relieve the apprehension of the newly assigned G.P.-turned-pediatrician. Life may begin for some at 40, but for this G.P. it began in Nha Trang with his sudden acquisition of a large and growing pediatric practice!

The group of general practitioners had often *en route* debated about the type of patients who would be seen in the province hospitals. Before leaving the states all had received a list of the ten leading causes of death and illness in Viet Nam.

ILLNESS CHART

Leading illnesses: malaria, beri-beri, dysentery, influenza, trachoma, tuberculosis, whooping cough, amebiasis, pneumonia, measles.

Leading causes of death: tuberculosis, pneumonia, malaria, diphtheria, typhoid fever, meningitis, measles, beri-beri, diseases of early infancy.

A common denominator of most developing countries in the world is the "cause" of health problems. Poor sanitation, inadequate nutrition and lack of knowledge by basic personnel of community health problems head the list of "causes" which permit diseases to flourish. Preventive measures, particularly in the remote rural areas, are inadequate to the scope of the problem. There simply is not enough personnel to do the job that must be done. Viet Nam has one physician per 25,000 persons, mainly concentrated in cities and in the military, compared to the United States ratio of 1:700 or the Japanese ratio of 1:920. The hospital bed ratio in Viet Nam is 1½ per 1,000 persons. The United States has 1:9 and Japan, 1:5. Exotic diseases, seldom seen in North America, are serious problems in Viet Nam.

Leading illnesses and causes of death, as reported above, are mainly diseases of early infancy. Since few babies are delivered in hospitals, health authorities believe causes of infant deaths are largely unreported. From the records kept by the "new pediatrician" at the Nha Trang province hospital for the month of October every leading illness in the chart above was seen, with the following diseases added: hepatitis, cervical adenitis, tonsillitis, diphtheria, ascariasis, leprosy, encephalitis, bubonic plague and myopathy.

During that month 45 cases of bronchitis were admitted under the general heading of diarrhea; 55 cases were admitted which were later changed to diarrhea, dysentery and enteritis. It would only be fair to report that 278 patients were admitted during the period surveyed and 19 deaths occurred. Delayed admission to the hospital must be held responsible for some of the deaths. In many instances of injury or severe illness, the people must travel so far that it is a week or ten days before the patient is seen by a physician. Many of the admitting diagnosed cases were complicated by convulsions. Malnutrition should be placed high on the list, but might be questioned as a diagnosis.

For use of comparison the following diseases were charted for one ward walk (before the specialization in pediatrics was assumed by the general practitioner). Numbers were not included:

Medicine: Gallbladder disease, arthritis, icterus, pulmonary T.B., diarrhea, cholera, bubonic plague, severe anemia, cardiac disease, hemiplegia, gastric ulcer, asthma, mental disease, malaria, syphilis, assorted worms.

A one-day survey of patients on the surgical ward indicates the variety of problems seen in that section:

Surgery: splenectomy, head injury, abdominal pain, shrapnel in hand, infected foot, fractured hip, air crash injury, acute urinary retention, imperforate anus, renal calculus, severe burns, fracture of femur, car accident-multiple injuries, hernia, peptic ulcer, cystostomy, head and jaw-multiple injuries, fractured ribs, grenade explosion, fractured arm, sarcoma of leg, skin graft, abdominal cyst, leg amputation, shrapnel in knee.

Thirteen of this group were listed as battle casualties. Due to duplication in some of these patients, the 50% figure for battle casualties would be in error. This would be misleading in attempting to estimate the percentage of casualties among civilians needing medical care in Viet Nam. Many times the casualties died before being admitted to the hospital. In one instance, four out of six injured civilians died before surgery could be done.

There has been some confusion concerning the relationship of *Project Viet Nam* to the many organizations contacted before and during the overseas tour and the overlapping activities of some of these groups. The *Project* is simply a cooperative medical effort of America's Inter-Voluntary Agencies for the people of South Viet Nam, with the assistance of the American Medical Association and the Agency for International Development (AID). The parent organization of *Project Viet Nam* is the People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc. The President of that organization, William B. Walsh, M.D., is also the President of *Project Hope* and *Project Viet Nam*.

A certain confusion experienced by some of the participants in *Project Viet Nam* and the other programs for American volunteers would seem to be a natural outcome of a program which is rather loosely organized at this stage. Control of *Project Viet Nam* overseas has been shifted to USOM. In foreign countries that organization is responsible for all moves made by the many American teams utilized in the area. USOM regional offices are found in all the larger cities in Viet Nam.

One other step is of possible interest. In July, 1965 the Vietnamese Minister of Health and representatives of the U.S. Public Health Service met to plan a cooperative program for long-range improvement of health care in Viet Nam. This cooperative effort includes upgrading of training and health education services and activities, development of provincial hospitals, assignment of responsibilities for rural health, establishment of evacuation services from villages and district health units to provincial and regional hospitals, and extension of activities related to malaria control and eradication. The scope of the program and the size of the challenges it faces can be recognized perhaps if one understands that it involves long-standing health problems in the villages and among the vast rural population (including the Montagnard hill dwellers who speak another language), the 800,000 refugees from North Viet Nam and the ever present guerillas.

The primary objective of *Project Viet Nam*—to assist in the care of sick civilians—probably could not be better achieved in a country that needs doctors, needs food and needs medicine, and where even simple routine immunization has been largely neglected because of more pressing needs. The oppor-

tunity to meet the Vietnamese people and to understand them is unexcelled; and the reaction of the patients and their families and friends to American assistance is extremely gratifying. At the end of the 60-day tour, the first members of *Project Viet Nam* had a healthy regard for the citizens of that country and a real sympathy for the magnitude of their health problems.

The plan is to send five or more general practitioners, as well as surgical teams, to Viet Nam every month with each group rotating home after serving a two-month period. It is hoped that a number of retired physicians may want to participate in this program.

To be quite personal, it was the greatest vacation I've ever had and an opportunity I felt I could not miss. Now that I am back in the States, I realize more than ever how lacking the people of Viet Nam are for the skills of physicians. The need unquestionably is great.

Culver Praises Iowa Mother of the Year

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN C. CULVER

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 22, 1966

Mr. CULVER. Mr. Speaker, recently I was privileged to participate in honoring Mrs. Betty Berrie of Dubuque and McGregor as Iowa's Mother of the Year. The selection committee "found Mrs. Berrie has a rare talent of being able to combine her capability as a mother and housewife with a career in the service of her community and church," to which I wholeheartedly subscribe.

Mrs. Berrie has been active in the Dubuque Archdiocesan Council of Catholic Women for 16 years, and since 1960 she has served as executive secretary of the archdiocesan women's council. In 1964 Mrs. Berrie was elected director of the Dubuque province to serve on the board of the National Council of Catholic Women.

In addition to the above activities, Mrs. Berrie has been active in the PTA, women's clubs, community projects and human relations groups. In 1960, the Postmaster General cited Mrs. Berrie for her activity in combating the spread of indecent literature.

Mrs. Berrie is an outstanding example of a woman who has combined family life with service to her community. Her selection as Mother of the Year is a richly deserved honor, one which I feel should be recognized by everyone in the State of Iowa and the Nation.

Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent I place a recent article on Mrs. Berrie which appeared in the Des Moines Register at this point in the RECORD.

MOTHER OF THE YEAR CHOSEN

Mrs. Betty Berrie of Dubuque and McGregor has been chosen Iowa Mother of the Year, Mrs. Irving A. Weingart, state selection chairman, said Saturday.

Thirty-four women were nominated for the honor, Mrs. Weingart said. The selection committee of ten women "found Mrs. Berrie has a rare talent of being able to combine her capability as a mother and housewife with a career in the service of her community and church."

presently there exist no leaders of this capability, but he expressed confidence that the national reform will create and produce its own leaders. He said this has been a historical fact on many occasions in many countries.

(Mr. GONZALEZ (at the request of Mr. TUNNEY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. GONZALEZ' remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

(Mr. GONZALEZ (at the request of Mr. TUNNEY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. GONZALEZ' remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

A WALK FOR DECENT WELFARE

(Mr. SWEENEY (at the request of Mr. TUNNEY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Speaker, as Congressman at Large for the State of Ohio, I am sad to report that this morning at 7 a.m. in my State, a march began from Cleveland, Ohio, to the State capitol at Columbus, Ohio, called, A Walk for Decent Welfare. I am sad because of the fact that the citizens engaged in this public effort have for many years been registering appeals concerning the inadequacy of the allowances for welfare recipients in the State of Ohio. Visits, letters, and testimony before the State legislatures, and State officials have produced no results, and therefore, this morning several hundred people began a walk of protest.

What is this particular grievance all about? It is very simple, Mr. Speaker, the State of Ohio has established what they call minimum standards for welfare recipients in order that such a person on welfare might have the bare essentials and the minimum amounts to clothe, house, and feed themselves.

The State of Ohio, although enjoying historic revenues and possessed of surplus funds in the millions, has for a period of many years paid but 70 percent of this minimum amount to these welfare claimants.

Mr. Speaker, we are living in a day and age when we think in terms of prosperity and wealth, and disease as being remote and thousands of miles removed from this land which has been so blessed by Almighty God, but indeed, Mr. Speaker, in every large city of the State of Ohio, there are mothers who on the 20th day of each month are without funds to pay for shoes for their children, there are mothers who are unable to provide vegetables, and fruit, and milk in the family diet.

In my State, Mr. Speaker, on the 20th day of each month or thereabouts, these mothers are without funds to provide warm clothing in the wintertime and adequate medical and dental care. It is

sad, Mr. Speaker, that in the second largest industrial State in the Union, and the sixth richest State of the Union, that an adequacy of public assistance cannot be provided when the State government has the capability.

Mr. Speaker, the plight that I have described of these Ohio people and these Ohio children does not result from the fact that the Federal Government has failed to provide supplemental Federal grant assistance programs for the indigent of my State, but rather, Mr. Speaker, it results from the disposition of the present State leadership in using Federal funds as a substitute for State action rather than as a supplement to State action.

Today I draw the attention of the House to the fact that I called upon Secretary Gardner, of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, to undertake a study and report as to whether or not Federal funds ought to continue to flow to States of the Union who fail to meet their own established minimum standards under the aid to dependent children programs and under general relief programs as well.

Mr. Speaker, I am of the opinion that there ought to be an arresting of such Federal assistance if the recipient States are unmindful of and refuse to discharge their State responsibility to their own needy, and who in the alternative promote State austerity and develop dollar surpluses in State general funds at the expense of those welfare recipients who are on the very lowest rung of the economic ladder and who have the greatest need in these prosperous days.

THANT'S VIETNAM PROPOSALS

(Mr. McVICKER (at the request of Mr. TUNNEY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. McVICKER. Mr. Speaker, like a majority of my colleagues in this body, I fear, I am troubled and perplexed as to the course we should pursue in bringing an end to the tragic conflict in Vietnam.

Amidst all my doubts, though, I have held one firm conviction: that we should explore every avenue to peace and should utilize the offices of every responsible mediator in that quest.

We cannot continue indefinitely our present policy of limited involvement and attrition. I apprehend that we shall soon come face to face with a hard decision—to escalate or to deescalate. Before we reach that point, let us once again open the door to the conference room.

In that regard, I should like to call the attention of my colleagues to an appraisal in the New York Times of Secretary General U Thant's latest proposal for defusing this incipient powder keg:

THANT'S VIETNAM PROPOSALS

Secretary General Thant has performed a useful service in focusing attention again on the real problem in Vietnam, which is to move toward a negotiated settlement of the Communist insurrection.

The bombing of North Vietnam and the buildup to more than a quarter-million

American troops in the South have neither reduced the Vietcong forces nor stabilized the internal politics of Saigon. On the contrary, the Vietcong buildup also is continuing, aided by infiltration of regular North Vietnamese units. And the American takeover of the military conflict has simply freed the Buddhist and military politicians of South Vietnam to pursue their power struggle. There is little reason to believe that further escalation will change the picture.

Mr. Thant's suggestion is that a new attempt be made to deescalate instead. His three-point proposal calls for the cessation of bombing North Vietnam; the scaling down of military action in the South to achieve a cease-fire; the opening of peace talks among all those who are "actually fighting," including the Vietcong.

Sooner or later, this is the only way the war in Vietnam can be brought to an end. The unanswered question is how this process can best be set in motion.

The efforts of numerous intermediaries to bring Hanoi to the conference table have all run into the same demand: talk to the Vietcong's National Liberation Front. Until the Saigon government shows a willingness to do so, there will be no prospect of peace. But what incentive can there be for the military junta to seek a compromise settlement when American troops protect it against the consequences of political folly? The dream that the military balance can be turned and a Communist surrender achieved will only give way to reality when the American commitment ceases to be open-ended.

At the present rate of buildup there will be 350,000 to 400,000 American troops in South Vietnam by the end of the year. The talk in Washington of higher targets of 600,000 or 750,000 American troops in 1967 and later is further encouragement to political irresponsibility in Saigon.

At some point a halt must be called. American forces may be able to contain the larger Vietcong units, but it is much more doubtful that they can destroy the Vietcong's political network or its guerrilla bands. Every whirl upward on the escalation spiral merely restores the military balance at best—but at a higher level. A halt in the buildup may prove far more effective in forcing the Saigon factions to unite and in bringing them to face up to the need of opening contacts with the other side.

THE RAPID ACCUMULATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN BUSINESS

(Mr. ROONEY of Pennsylvania (at the request of Mr. TUNNEY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ROONEY of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, it has been my privilege on many occasions to hear remarks given by Mr. Edmund F. Martin, chairman and chief executive officer of the Bethlehem Steel Corp. When I am unable to be present as part of the group he is addressing, I look forward to having a copy of his remarks and reading them at my leisure.

Very recently, Mr. Martin delivered a thoughtful and thought-provoking talk before the American Iron and Steel Institute. It is concerned with the enormous amount of knowledge man has achieved in the centuries since the birth of Christ—knowledge of himself, his fellow human beings, and the universe they inhabit. It particularly stressed the fan-

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"It is for this reason that Congress must take a look at the programs supported by federal aid. If they are not effective, then we should stop spending the money in these ways and put it in some other more effective program."

FAIR PACKAGING AND LABELING BILL

(Mr. THOMPSON of New Jersey (at the request of Mr. TUNNEY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. THOMPSON of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I have today introduced a fair packaging and labeling bill identical to H.R. 15440, introduced June 2 by the gentleman from West Virginia, the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce [Mr. STAGGERS].

I have introduced the bill in my own name to underscore my support for the idea that the consumer is entitled to a higher degree of accuracy in the seller's claims about the wares he is offering in the marketplace. I also believe this bill will provide for protecting the rights of the seller of items covered by this legislation through due-process procedures.

Under unanimous consent, I insert in the Record a brief analysis of H.R. 15440, as introduced by the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. STAGGERS]:

EXPLANATION OF H.R. 15440: FAIR PACKAGING AND LABELING BILL, INTRODUCED BY CONGRESSMAN HARLEY O. STAGGERS

H.R. 15440 directs the Secretary of HEW, and the FTC to promulgate regulations to insure that the labels of packages of consumer commodities adequately inform consumers of the quantity and composition of the contents, and facilitate price comparisons.

—identity of the commodity and the name and place of business of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor would be required.

—a separate and accurate statement of net quantity of contents (in terms of weight, measure or numerical count) would be required.

—the net quantity of contents of a package containing less than four pounds or one gallon would be required to be expressed in terms of weight or fluid volume in ounces or in whole units or pounds, pints or quarts, i.e., 19 ounces in place of 1 pint 3 ounces.

—minimum standards with respect to location and prominence of the statements of net quantity of contents would be established.

—qualifying words or phrases, such as "giant pint", which exaggerate net quantity, would be prohibited.

H.R. 15440 provides authority for the Secretary of HEW, and the FTC to promulgate regulations on a commodity line basis when necessary—

—to require sufficient ingredients or composition information to be placed conspicuously on the package.

—to prohibit cents off sales when not really cents off to consumers.

—to set standards defining size nomenclature relating to quantity such as "small," "medium," or "large."

—to set serving standards to enable the consumer to compare competing products.

—to prevent packages of sizes, shapes or dimensional proportions which are likely to deceive consumers.

H.R. 15440 provides for the establishment of weights and quantities standards, to facilitate price per unit comparisons.

—offers industry and consumers oppor-

tunity to set standards for weights and quantities through the voluntary product standard program of the Department of Commerce.

—prohibits the promulgation of any regulation that would vary from a voluntary product standard.

—exempts weights or measures less than two ounces.

—exempts packages of particular dimensions or capacity customarily used unless likely to deceive.

—exempts particular dimensions or capacities of returnable or reusable glass containers for beverages which are in use as of effective date of Act.

H.R. 15440 provides for due process procedures in the promulgation of regulations.

—the bill incorporates due process safeguards which provide assurance of adequate notice, and ample opportunity for hearing in the administrative process of promulgating regulations.

—in addition regulations promulgated by the Secretary of HEW, or the FTC are subject to judicial review.

CHIEF PANAMANIAN TREATY NEGOTIATOR: "AN ACKNOWLEDGED MARXIST INTELLECTUAL"

(Mr. FLOOD (at the request of Mr. TUNNEY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Speaker, since the acquiescence by the executive branch of our Government to radical demands by Panama to renegotiate the 1903 Canal Treaty, many thoughtful citizens of the United States have wondered why Panama, which has been benefited so greatly by the Panama Canal, should seek a new treaty.

The explanations offered are varied and many of them questionable. Two of the most often repeated objections to the present treaty are its "sovereignty" and "perpetuity" provisions, which have been used by Panamanian politicians to inflame the Panamanian people to a high degree of emotionalism.

In this connection, these politicians never point out that the "perpetuity" feature applies with equal force to the United States, and that as long as our country retains the powers of sovereignty over the Canal Zone, the independence of the Republic of Panama is guaranteed.

The chief of the Panama team in the current diplomatic negotiations is Dr. Diogenes de la Rosa, an "acknowledged Marxist intellectual and long-term socialist." He has frankly stated that the task for Panama after finishing the negotiations is "to remake the state from within, revise its institutions and rectify its method of conducting public affairs." He then emphasizes that if this is not done, "any benefits from the negotiations would lose all significance."

The meaning of such pronouncement is obvious. The canal is to become the source of still more extensive benefits for Panama, and this can be done only by revenue from greatly increased transit tolls or by further taxation of the American people.

Unfortunately, the shipping industry of the United States has not been alert, to what has been transpiring on the

isthmus, no one in the Senate has spoken out in defense of our country's interests, and the taxpayers of our Nation are not organized.

A recent article from Panama City, Republic of Panama, by Ralph Skinner, a longtime resident of the isthmus and distinguished correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, gives new light on the subject of why Panama seeks a new treaty and is commended for reading by every Member of the Congress.

The indicated article follows:

WHY PANAMA SEEKS NEW PACT

(By Ralph K. Skinner, Special correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor)

PANAMA CITY.—It is important that Panama come to an agreement with the United States on a canal treaty, says Dr. Diogenes de la Rosa, chief Panamanian treaty negotiator.

An even more important job for Panama, he says, is "to reconstruct our national life from bottom to top, economically, socially, and politically." He has been addressing various groups throughout the country, briefing them on the larger meaning of the upcoming treaty and its potential for transforming the whole future of Panama.

Dr. de la Rosa said: "The first task, after treaty negotiations are finished, is for the people of Panama to remake the state from within, revise its institutions, and rectify its method of conducting public affairs. If this is not done, any benefits from the negotiations would lose all significance."

The Panama intellectual says that he is chiefly aiming criticism at the groups here who control commerce and industry and use their political power to safeguard vested interests and to rotate selected officials.

Dr. de la Rosa accused these groups of callous exclusion of the laborer, farmer, and humble artisan, as well as the emerging middle class, from participation in national planning, policymaking, and opportunity.

AN OFFENSIVE NOTE

As an acknowledged Marxist intellectual and long-term socialist, as one who has tried to improve labor codes in several Latin-American countries, this is offensive to Dr. de la Rosa's philosophy and his sense of what is good for Panama and its citizens.

Asked if he expects much support in these radical changes from the government, he replied: "Any fair or honest Panamanian of whatever position or background must recognize that we cannot go along as we have for the past 60 years, if we have in mind the interest of our country."

Asked about leadership in these needed reforms, the Panamanian negotiator said: "There does not exist in Panama at this moment any political party able to do this task. Existing parties belong to a past which is dead and must be buried. No political party here is organized in terms of reference to our very real national problems. Political parties talk the language of failure, suspicion, and jealousy. What is needed is clear language to express and find solutions to the problems we are confronting now."

He added: "When I think in terms of reforms, I think of a national movement rather than political parties. We need a new national conscience to face the future."

The negotiator termed "unpredictable" the length of time to develop this national movement. He said: "When and if the people understand, they will react rapidly. There are many groups who do not wish the people to understand, to protect their own interests. For example, most newspapers won't help because it would be against their interests, but there are presently some other media which would help."

Regarding leadership for this national movement, Dr. de la Rosa confirmed that

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, June 22, 1966]

AGAINST THE U.S. GRAIN

The Soviet Union is smart to buy Western wheat; perhaps it ought to buy more, on a more regular basis. The cost, in terms both of pride and gold, is bearable. In return, the foreign purchases cushion the impacts of unkind soil and weather, compensate for the inefficiencies built into the country's collectivized agricultural system, and buy time and domestic support for the farm programs that almost certainly will produce better grain harvests in the future.

The Soviet grain crop in 1963 was a disaster, requiring imports of 11 million tons. The 1965 grain total was very low, made so by harsh weather and by the government's courageous and overdue decision to squeeze less grain out of the farmers at low state-set prices. Together, the two years persuaded the leadership to undertake massive spending programs, offer the farmers more incentives and get off their backs. The government anticipated lower grain collections at the start, figuring on fatter results later. The grain collections have been lower. It is to meet this anticipated short-run deficit that the Canadian grain deal apparently was made. Moscow will buy three million tons a year for three years, for about \$800 million.

Secretary of Agriculture Freeman said the Canadian deal showed "the failure of the Soviet system." He's probably wrong. For once, the deal may have shown more reason and sense, since it was made not in response to a spot crisis but as part of a measured effort to put Soviet agriculture on a solid footing. The weather hasn't been so bad in the Soviet Union this year; the planning has been better. That's why Moscow is buying.

Thanks to the American maritime unions, the farmers of the United States don't have to bother figuring how to get a piece of the Soviet grain business. The unions in 1964 rammed into law their demand that half of any grain shipments to Russia must be in American bottoms; the high American shipping rates make U.S. wheat prohibitively expensive in most instances. The question is rendered moot these days by the United States' low wheat reserves and high Vietnam involvement. But 800 million dollars—in hard currency or gold—is a lot of dough.

Mr. McGOVERN. I would like to comment also, Mr. President, that the editorial is inaccurate in two particulars.

First, the shipping requirement is not in law. It is an Executive regulation, or requirement, which could be rescinded yet this afternoon by the Secretary of Commerce. It cannot be blamed on Congress. Every action we have taken recently on this subject has reflected disapproval of the wheat shipping restriction.

Second, the question of unnecessarily sacrificed wheat markets is not moot; American farmers have at least 60 million idle cultivable acres. They will have 50 million or more idle next year, in spite of a 15-percent or nearly 8-million-acre increase in wheat acreage allotments. They could produce 2 or 3 million tons more of wheat on a fraction of that idle acreage, and rebuild our reserves at the same time.

The fact is that the farmers of America, grain handlers, railroads, maritime workers themselves, and shipping companies are all being penalized hundreds of millions of dollars by a shipping regulation that makes no sense at all.

As is much too often the case, the farmers are the principal goats.

But this is not the only instance in which farmers are the goats of unwise export restrictions.

There is an export order still in existence limiting the number of cattle hides which can be sold abroad to about one-third of our conjectured production—and I use the word "conjectured" advisedly, for the figures used do not justify even the word "estimated."

The Export Control Act provides that export restrictions cannot be put on agricultural commodities for economic reasons if the Secretary of Agriculture finds the supply in excess of our domestic requirements.

The Secretary of Agriculture was not asked about the adequacy of our supply of hides. The Secretary of Commerce worked out his own justification for imposing an export order. He says he saw some Department of Agriculture reports and that the Secretary of Agriculture concurred in the order. He contends that an order is proper in the absence of any finding by the Secretary of Agriculture.

But it is obvious that any finding by the Secretary of Agriculture was avoided. The fact that the order allows 11 million hides to be exported is certainly proof that the supply exceeds domestic requirements. Nonetheless, the very provision of the Export Control Act from which agricultural commodities are exempted if they are in excess of domestic requirements, is the provision under which the hide controls have been imposed.

The hide order, Mr. President, was one of those anti-inflation moves that did not work. Farmers were penalized at least 25 cents per hundred pounds on all the beef they market for the purpose of keeping down the price of shoes, which went up very promptly after the order was issued. The order has been modified, but not rescinded as it should be.

Some are inclined to deprecate the importance of the order to cattlemen's and dairymen's income. After all, they say, it is only about 1 or 2 percent of gross on the cattle sold.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, to include in the Record an article from the Washington Farmletter which indicates that the loss of hide value may be 10 percent of the producers' net income.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Hides: The 25¢ a cwt. cut in cattle prices estimated by USDA due to the restriction on hide exports may not seem much on a 1000-pound steer selling for around \$250—only \$2.50, or 1%. But it looms big when related to the margin of value over costs in cattle feeding.

USDA's report of average prices and costs in feeding steers in the Corn Belt, 1954 through June 1965, shows that margins on 1050-pound fed steers ranged from minus \$13.32 in 1963-64 to a high of \$71.78 in 1957-58. For 1964-65 it's estimated at \$55.71. This margin above cost doesn't include overhead, cost of pasture, or death losses.

The average for 11 feeding years was \$26.61. A cut of 25¢ a cwt. would have meant about a 10% cut in margins. With the margin this year (1965-66) likely around \$40-\$50, the ef-

fect of lower prices of hides means a cut in net feeding return per head of around 5%.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the hide order is another instance of misuse of the Export Control Act to make farmers the scapegoats in the solution of a problem for which they are not to blame.

I have pending before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, S. 3175, a bill to amend the Export Control Act to require that before export controls are applied to any agricultural commodity the Secretary of Agriculture "shall conduct a public hearing and shall have determined that the supply of the commodity is and will continue for an extended period of time to be substantially inadequate to meet the requirements of the domestic economy."

I speak today to advise my colleagues that I am requesting early hearings on the bill.

Hearings have been delayed because of other priority matters, because of the Department of Commerce's hearings and modification of the hide export order, and to allow time to determine the effect of the revised hide order.

The serious effect this unjustified order is having on producers continues to be apparent. The Department of Agriculture itself is my authority for the contention that the export restriction has depressed cattle prices at least 25 cents per hundred pounds.

The serious effect of the senseless wheat shipping order on American producers is again made painfully apparent by the Canadian wheat sale to Russia.

It is time that we carefully examine and revise the Export Control Act so it cannot be misused. I am sure that the chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee will handle the matter just as expeditiously as possible, in his customary accommodating and courteous way.

I hope my colleagues will be prepared to give him and his committee the benefit of their views and recommendations when the matter is subjected to a much-needed review.

THE LEGALITY OF U.S. PRESENCE IN VIETNAM

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, now, for the first time, we have an authoritative analysis of the legal basis for U.S. assistance to the Republic of Vietnam. In my own thinking there can no longer be any doubt about the legality of our assistance to the people of South Vietnam in view of the report to be distributed today by the American Bar Association.

While the debate over policy in Vietnam must go on, the question concerning the legality of U.S. action in Vietnam should now be resolved. I have never doubted the lawfulness of U.S. assistance to the Republic of Vietnam. Today, it is my privilege to present to the Senate and the American people a document which, I believe, supports this proposition beyond any reasonable doubt.

It is one point to question the policy choices of the United States in Vietnam, but it is quite another to challenge the

June 22, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

13231

GRANTS PASS, OREG.,
June 21, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
Urgently need your support on H.R. 14122.
Thank you for past favors.

DELORES ROLEY,
Secretary, NALC.

CORVALLIS, OREG.,
June 21, 1966.

WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Urge your assistance getting bill H.R. 14122
on floor earliest time.

RAY WEATHERS,
Secretary 1274, NALC.

SALEM, OREG.,
June 21, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
Urge your immediate action to expedite
enactment of Government salary bill, H.R.
14122 by July 1, 1966.

B. CECIL BASWETT.

GRANTS PASS, OREG.,
June 20, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
Urgently need your support on H.R. 14122.
Thanking you for past favors.

Mrs. A. H. STRUNK, Sr.

OREGON CITY, OREG.,
June 20, 1966.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Building,
Washington, D.C.:
SENATOR: We strongly urge H.R. 14122 be
brought before the Senate immediately.
NALC BRANCH 1140.

GRANTS PASS, OREG.,
June 20, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
Urgently need your support on H.R. 14122.
Thanking you for past favors.

ARTHUR H. STRUNK, Sr.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
June 22, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:
Urgent that you contact Senate leadership
and Senate Policy Committee to have H.R.
14122 brought before the Senate immedi-
ately.

FORTY-TWO LETTER CARRIERS WORKING
FROM LENTS STATION.

ROSEBURG, OREG.,
June 21, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
I urge you to vote "yes" for H.R. 14122
postal pay raise to be effective July 1, 1966.

ROBERT H. JOHNSON,
Roseburg, Oreg., Branch 1518, National
Association of Letter Carriers.

SALEM, OREG.,
June 21, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:
Strongly urge you use influence to persuade
Senate Policy Committee to schedule H.R.
14122 for vote immediately. This bill is
needed now; stalling tactics of committee to
prevent passage prior July 1 is contrary to
the intent Congress and the needs of those
affected. Thanks.

M. W. SCOTT.

KLAMATH FALLS, OREG.,
June 21, 1966.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Urge your support to get pay bill H.R.
14122 out of policy committee and onto
floor of Senate.

Sincerely,

JOHN W. STROOP,
Secretary, Branch No. 1784, NALC.

ONTARIO, OREG.,
June 21, 1966.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

We urge you to contact the Senate Policy
Committee to favorably report out H.R.
14122, postal pay bill.

OLIVER PARKER,
President, Branch 3750, NALC.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
June 22, 1966.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senator,
Washington, D.C.:

Urge action on H.R. 14122 and H.R. 14266
for quick enactment.

H. Eklof, D. Patterson, V. Welsgerber,
K. Bundy, E. Graves, R. Jones, C. Juett,
J. Kelly, C. Harr, R. Veith, J. Steele,
R. Petrasso, W. Keefer, J. Campbell D.
Reynolds, D. Boeckel, R. Smith, D.
Brown, T. Fleming, W. Concannon, H.
Johnson, R. Pierce, M. Nelson, D.
Knaks, R. Hutchings, R. Keller, A.
Jones, R. Green, H. Walday, S. Root, F.
Scholz, A. Rein, R. Pickup, T. Caldwell,
L. Parmian, J. Schmotzel, G. Pierce, G.
Melchi, R. Griones, C. Salmel, E.
Shirts, J. Cobb, C. Sherman, R. Whis-
nant, I. Wangsnes, A. H. Millsbaugh,
B. G. Sizemore, L. P. Scheetz, G. Juern-
berg, A. G. May, K. Pullen, E. Waritz,
G. Schultz.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
June 21 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

H.R. 14122, please get it on the floor im-
mediately. Support it with "yes" vote.
Thanks.

E. H. JESKE.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
June 22, 1966.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senator,
Washington, D.C.:

Urge action on H.R. 14122 and H.R. 14266
for quick enactment.

H. Eklof, D. Patterson, V. Welsgerber, K.
Bundy, E. Graves, R. Veith, J. Steele,
R. Petrasso, W. Keefer, J. Campbell,
D. Reynolds, D. Boeckel, R. Smith, D.
Brown, T. Fleming, W. Concannon, H.
Johnson, R. Pierce, I. Wangsnes, A. H.
Millsbaugh, B. G. Sizemore, L. P.
Scheetz, G. Juernberg, A. G. May, K.
Pullen, E. Waritz, G. Schultz, M. Nel-
son, D. Knaus, R. Hutchings, R.
Kahler, A. Jones, R. Green, H. Walden,
S. Root, F. Scholz, A. Rein, R. Pick-
up, T. Caldwell, L. Parmian, J. Sch-
motzal, G. Pierce, G. Melcher, R.
Axlonex, C. Salmari, E. Shirts, J. Cobb,
C. Sherman, R. Whisanant, R. Jones,
C. Juett, J. Kelly, C. Harr.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
June 22, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Urge action and passage of H.R. 14122.

LYLE WALTERS.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
June 22, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Urge action and passage of H.R. 14122.
CHARLES POTTS.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
June 22, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Urge action and passage of H.R. 14122.
HARRY MABIN.

IT'S TIME TO LOOK AT OUR EXPORT
CONTROL ORDERS

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. President, the
other day our neighbor to the north,
Canada, sold Russia another \$800 million
worth of wheat. They are to deliver 3
million tons a year for 3 years to the
Soviet Union.

The United States undoubtedly could
have had a share in this huge order—as
our producers might have shared in past
large Russian purchases—except for a
wholly senseless export control order re-
quiring that half of any wheat we sell
to the Russians be shipped in American
vessels. The price of American shipping
is so high that the order makes it im-
possible for our producers to compete for
this rather large piece of hard dollar,
commercial, business.

Nearly everyone is in agreement on
this fact. Administration officials, the
Senate Agriculture Committee, and the
Foreign Relations Committee have all
affirmatively stated that the regulation
under the Export Control Act of 1949, as
amended, is unwise. Everyone, except a
very shortsighted labor group, whose
spokesman agreed during testimony be-
fore the Foreign Relations Committee
that they should not interfere in a dollar
transaction for wheat, but took his testi-
mony back in talking to reporters outside
the committee room.

In this instance, a misguided labor
group is actually being allowed to dictate
American foreign policy because of the
unwillingness of the administration to
rescind an export order of questionable
legal foundation, and unquestionable
stupidity, and offend the union involved.

The Washington Post this morning
carried an editorial, captioned "Against
the U.S. Grain," in which they say:

Thanks to the American maritime unions,
the farmers of the United States don't have
to bother figuring how to get a piece of the
Soviet grain business. The unions in 1964
rammed into law their demand that half of
any grain shipments to Russia must be in
American bottoms; the high American ship-
ping rates make U.S. wheat prohibitively ex-
pensive in most instances. The question is
rendered moot these days by the United
States low wheat reserves and high Vietnam
involvement. But 800 million dollars—in
hard currency—is a lot of dough.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Presi-
dent, for the full text of the editorial
to be included in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:

June 27, 1966

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basic legality of our assistance. Comparisons between our presence in Vietnam and Soviet aggression in Hungary and Communist Chinese aggression in India and in Korea are demagogic; the document I am presenting should lay all these comparisons to rest.

Prepared for distribution by the American Bar Association, the document was written by three respected professors of law: Myres S. McDougal, sterling professor law at Yale and former president of the American Society of International Law; John Norton Moore, associate professor of law at the University of Virginia Law School; and James L. Underwood, assistant professor of law at the University of South Carolina College of Law. Their paper does not argue for or against U.S. policy in Vietnam; it concentrates on the law.

The authors assert that:

The present United States assistance to the Republic of Vietnam is lawful under the most widely accepted principles of customary international law.

Their discussions of this proposition shows that:

First. The Republic of South Vietnam is a state under international law, and that for present practical and treaty purposes, it is a separate international entity from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam—North Vietnam.

Second. Because of this recognition of two independent states, the Vietnam conflict cannot be legally characterized as a "civil war."

Third. The generally recognized Government of South Vietnam has legally requested assistance from the United States to meet a situation it recognizes as outside armed aggression.

Fourth. U.S. assistance is in accord with the right of collective self-defense as construed under international law and the United Nations Charter.

Fifth. The United States has properly sought to bring the conflict to the attention and within machinery of the United Nations.

Sixth. The Geneva accords of 1954 were not breached by the United States whose presence was duly requested by the Government of South Vietnam, but were in fact violated by North Vietnam by virtue of sending its regular armed forces into South Vietnam.

Seventh. U.S. Armed Forces are in South Vietnam as sanctioned by accepted U.S. constitutional processes, executive-congressional actions, and by virtue of proper resolutions, authorizations, and appropriations.

The authors conclude that "lawfulness means compliance with the basic structures of international law and the United Nations; structures designed to promote self determination and world public order."

I fully subscribe to this careful and important study and commend it to the attention of the American people. It sustains as lawful the presence of our forces and their actions to help the people of South Vietnam attain self determination and freedom. The conscience of the Nation can rest more easily as the result of this historic report. The Nation should be grateful to the Ameri-

can Bar Association and to the authors of this report.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, to have printed in the RECORD, as a part of my remarks, the most pertinent aspects of this approximately 250-page study.

There being no objection, the excerpts from the study were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE LAWFULNESS OF UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

In recent months, critics of United States assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam have increasingly used legal arguments in their attacks on that assistance. They have asserted that the United States presence and activities in Viet Nam violate general principles of international law, the United Nations Charter, and the United States Constitution. In support of these assertions, they argue that the Republic of Viet Nam is not a state, that the United States is merely intervening in a civil war, that this intervention neither qualifies as self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter nor is otherwise legally justified, and that since Congress has not formally declared war the present United States military presence and activities in Viet Nam exceed the executive power. Although there is certainly room for choice and disagreement among the available policy alternatives, these legal arguments substantially misstate the case.

The present United States assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam is lawful under the most widely accepted principles of customary international law, the United Nations Charter and the Constitution of the United States. Since the Republic of Viet Nam has requested aid from the United States and other nations of the world to meet a situation with a significant component of outside armed aggression, there can be no question that the United States and the other nations responding with appropriate assistance are lawfully acting pursuant to the right of self-defense recognized under customary international law and the United Nations Charter. Moreover, the executive-congressional action taken in rendering assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam is in accordance with United States constitutional processes.

These conclusions are based not on mere legalistic exercises but on the genuine shared expectations of the international community as developed through a long history of practices and authoritative communications and reflected in principles designed to ensure minimum world public order. The principal thrust or many of the more important principles of contemporary international law, both customary and as incorporated into the United Nations Charter, is to secure genuine freedom of choice to the peoples of the world about their own form of government. Thus, under customary international law, states have not only been accorded a most comprehensive right of self-defense but have also been authorized to give aid to the established governments of other states, when such states are attacked by enemies from without or within. Similarly, the self-determination of peoples is stated as a principal goal of the United Nations and few of its goals have been more insistently sought in the practice of the organization; the Charter contains many provisions designed to preclude attacks, by any means, upon the territorial and political integrity of states; and the sum total of provisions in the Charter would, in the absence of an effective centralized peacekeeping machinery, appear greatly to enhance the authorization of states reciprocally to assist each other when subjected to attack. These widely ac-

cepted principles are consistent with declared United States goals of complete self-determination for the people of the Republic of Viet Nam and the maintenance of minimum world order through the rule of law.

The following discussion will show point by point that the United States presence in Viet Nam is lawful under customary international law and the United Nations Charter, that the particular United States activities in Viet Nam are lawful; that the United States has met its obligations under the United Nations Charter; that the Geneva Accords support the United States position in Viet Nam; and that the executive-congressional action rendering assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam is in accordance with United States constitutional processes. In particular, the discussion will show in detail that the Republic of Viet Nam is a state under international law and that today there are substantial expectations that the Republic of Viet Nam (South Viet Nam—the R.V.N.) and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (North Viet Nam—the D.R.V.) are separate and independent states under international law; that the Viet Nam conflict can not be fairly characterized as a "civil war"; that the R.V.N. has requested assistance from the United States to meet armed aggression; that the present United States assistance to the R.V.N. is in accordance with the right of self-defense recognized under customary international law and the United Nations Charter; that the United States seeks a solution through the machinery of the United Nations; that the United States assistance is supported by the Geneva Accords which have been fundamentally breached by the D.R.V. in its armed aggression against the R.V.N.; and that the executive-congressional action taken in rendering assistance to the R.V.N. is in accordance with United States constitutional processes, as authoritatively interpreted by successive presidents and congresses of the United States.

I. THE UNITED STATES PRESENCE IN VIET NAM IS LAWFUL UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

In examining the lawfulness of the United States assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam, it is important to distinguish between the lawfulness of the United States general presence in Viet Nam and the lawfulness of the particular United States activities in Viet Nam, and also to distinguish between the relevant international and constitutional law. When all relevant prescriptions are reviewed, it will appear evident both that the United States presence in the R.V.N. is lawful and that the use of the military instrument is well within the permissible limits of self-defense.

Under customary international law and the United Nations Charter, a recognized state such as the R.V.N. has the right to request and receive assistance from other states pursuant to its right of self-defense. It is important to note, however, that even if the R.V.N. were not a recognized state under international law, and was instead a mere "temporary zone" not "qualifying politically as a state," there still would be no basis for suggesting that it would not be entitled to receive assistance pursuant to its right of self-defense when subject to armed aggression from another zone in violation of a major purpose of the international agreement establishing it. In fact, the United Nations action in Korea and the major thrust of contemporary international law and the United Nations Charter strongly indicate that even a temporary zone in an internationally divided country has the right to request and receive assistance in self-defense. One of the major purposes of the United Nations Charter is to authorize collective measures for the suppression of acts of armed aggres-

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June 22, 1966

sion, whether by United Nations action as such, or by collective assistance from individual states, until the United Nations is able to act. Moreover, clearly one state does not have the right under customary international law and the United Nations Charter to armed aggression against another. And since there are substantial expectations today that the D.R.V. and the R.V.N. are separate and independent states under international law, any armed aggression by the D.V.R. against the R.V.N. is in violation of a fundamental principle of customary international law and the United Nations Charter. But again, it is important to note that even if the D.R.V. and the R.V.N. did not qualify as separate states under international law, but were instead merely separate "temporary zones" not "qualifying politically" as states, it is still clear that armed aggression by the D.R.V. against the R.V.N. would violate the same fundamental principle of customary international law and the United Nations Charter in breaching by force the core of the international agreement that established them in a situation not authorized by self-defense. Aggression in these circumstances, whether against a state under international law or against a mere "temporary zone" not "qualifying politically as a state" is still violative of fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter.

A. THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM IS A RECOGNIZED STATE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

The classical definition of a state under international law points to four factors, a people, a territory, a government, and capacity to enter into relations with other states. The Republic of Viet Nam meets all of these qualifications. It has a current population of approximately 15 million, administers a territory in Viet Nam south of the 17th parallel of approximately 66,000 square miles, has a widely recognized government, and has repeatedly been recognized as having capacity to enter into relations with other states. Similarly, at least since the Geneva Accords of 1954 the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam also meets these qualifications for statehood, although to a lesser extent with regard to international recognition. And although the R.V.N. and the D.R.V. qualify as states even under these restricted classical requirements, there have been instances in which political entities have been recognized as states in spite of difficulty in meeting one or more of these requirements as, for example, was the case with the State of Israel in 1948. In the final analysis, then, it is the expectations of the international community as manifested by their conduct toward a particular political entity which establishes its statehood. In this regard, probably the most important indicators of the expectations of the international community as to statehood are recognition and United Nations determinations. Thus it is said in Oppenheim, one of the leading international law treatises:

"In recognizing a new State as a member of the international community the existing States declare that in their opinion the new State fulfills the conditions of statehood as required by International Law."

In fact, this author asserts in unnecessary extreme that it is the act of recognition itself which creates statehood: "Recognition, while declaratory of an existing fact, is constitutive in its nature. Similarly, Article 10 of the Charter of the Organization of American States which is declaratory of the general international law in this respect provides: 'Recognition implies that the State granting it accepts the personality of the new State, with all the rights and duties that international law prescribes for the two States.'

In addition, as Professor O'Connell points out, United Nations determinations are also important indicators of statehood: "... the United Nations Charter allows membership only to States, and decision on membership would seem to be conclusive on the question

of *de facto* Statehood." Moreover, Professor Briggs has written that: "[A] determination [by the General Assembly of the United Nations] that ... [a state has] the capacity to accept and perform the obligations of the Charter is a recognition of ... statehood and international juridical capacity, whether or not ... [it is] admitted to the United Nations. It should also be pointed out that there are essentially no major differences in consequences under international law whether recognition is *de facto* or *de jure*."

In the light of these general principles of international law the next sections will examine the international status of the Republic of Viet Nam and its predecessor governments and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. This examination will look at the international status of these communities prior to the Geneva Accords of 1954, will discuss the effect of the Geneva Accords on that status, and finally will examine their status today, nearly twelve years after the Geneva Accords.

STATUS PRIOR TO THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1954

Historically, the territory comprising all of Viet Nam has been divided between rival political factions or separate government units during a substantial part of its history. In the words of Anthony Eden: "Indo-China had no tradition of unity, and there was little in common between the rich south and the overpopulated north." In recent times, Viet Nam was composed of several French territories themselves in turn parts of the larger French Indo-China, which during the Second World War was largely controlled by the Japanese. Following World War II, pursuant to the Potsdam agreements of 1945, Viet Nam was divided at the 16th Parallel between the British and the Chinese commands for the purpose of accepting the surrender of the Japanese troops in Indo-China. During this brief period of occupation in 1945-46, the Chinese allowed the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam under Ho Chi Minh to become entrenched principally in North Viet Nam as the government of Viet Nam, while the British subsequently encouraged return of South Viet Nam and moving North and which also claimed sovereignty to all of Viet Nam. Although territory both North and South has changed hands since then, at least from that time until the present, there have essentially been two separate governments in Viet Nam controlling different territories, developing along different ideological lines and both at least until recently, claiming sovereignty over all of Viet Nam.

In June 1948, the French High Commissioner for Indo-China signed a declaration recognizing the independence of the State of Viet Nam as an associated state within the French Union, and in 1949 and 1950 pursuant to the Elysee Agreement this status was achieved. Although the agreement did not effectively provide complete independence to the French recognized Bao Dai government at that time, it and subsequent French actions did create a substantial international status for the Bao Dai government which was in the next few years recognized by at least thirty states, a number which would grow to about thirty-five prior to the Geneva Accords. Pursuant to this legal status, the State of Viet Nam was given legal authority over many internal matters and was able to enter into some treaties in its own name. In particular, on June 18, 1952, it ratified the Treaty of Peace with Japan. And on November 5, 1952, it accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice with respect to disputes arising under this Japanese Peace Treaty, again in the name of the State of Viet Nam. Most importantly, however, in 1952 it was recognized as a state by the United Nations. Pursuant to a French draft resolution to admit the Bao Dai government of the State of Viet Nam to the United Nations,

the Security Council on September 19, 1952, voted 10 to 1 in favor of admission. The Soviet Union cast the only vote against the resolution, but this negative vote by a permanent member of the Council prevented the adoption of the resolution. In response to this Soviet "veto," on December 21, 1952, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution by a vote of 40 to 5 with 12 abstentions to the effect that the State of Viet Nam was a state qualified for membership in the United Nations, and calling on the Security Council to take note of this General Assembly determination. The resolution said in part:

"(The General Assembly) Determines that Vietnam is, in its judgment, a peace-loving state within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter, is able and willing to carry out the Obligations of the Charter, and should therefore be admitted to membership in the United Nations * * *"

By this resolution, the United Nations recognized the Bao Dai government of the State of Viet Nam as representative of a state under international law. It should be pointed out that this recognition of the Bao Dai government of Viet Nam was made by the United Nations despite arguments by the Soviet Union that Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Viet Nam was the only government of Viet Nam entitled to admission to the United Nations. A Soviet draft resolution to this effect to admit the D.R.V. as the sole representative of the State of Viet Nam was rejected in the Security Council by vote of 10 to 1.

As further evidence of its international status at this time, the State of Viet Nam (the Bao Dai government) was a member of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Food and Agricultural Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Telecommunication Union, the International Labour Organization, the Universal Postal Union, and the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

This substantial recognition by other nations of the world, membership in international organizations, conclusion of treaties in its own name, and United Nations recognition indicate that as early as 1952 the State of Viet Nam had substantial recognition as a state under international law.

This international status was further reinforced when in June, 1954 France signed a treaty with the State of Viet Nam which by its terms granted the State of Viet Nam complete independence as of June 4, 1954. Subsequent to the signing of this treaty but prior to the Geneva Accords, the leadership of the State of Viet Nam substantially passed from Bao Dai to Ngo Dinh Diem, who Bao Dai had appointed as the new Premier of the State of Viet Nam. Premier Diem formally organized his government on July 7, 1954. Thus prior to the Geneva Accords, there were some expectations that the State of Viet Nam was an independent state under international law and by the conclusion of the Conference the State of Viet Nam was recognized by about thirty five states. Moreover, at the Geneva Conference itself, the French made it clear to all concerned that the State of Viet Nam was legally independent and that France lacked the capacity to negotiate on its behalf.

The Democratic Republic of Viet Nam on the other hand could, prior to the Accords, also claim some right to be regarded as a state under international law, for at one time the French had concluded a treaty with the D.R.V. at least factually recognizing its existence, it had been recognized by the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union and a number of East European nations, and it had formal diplomatic relations at least with the People's Republic of China, although arguably under the classic test the statehood of the D.R.V. was not as clear as that of the State of Viet Nam. Perhaps an

indication of the true state of international expectations prior to the Geneva Accords is indicated by the fact that Professor Lauterpacht, at one time a judge of the International Court of Justice, in a list apparently made prior to the Accords, listed both Viet-minh and Viet Nam as separate states under international law.

THE EFFECT OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1954

Nine states participated in some phase or another of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China. They were Great Britain, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (Viet-minh), France, Laos, the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the State of Viet Nam, and the United States. It should be noted that both the D.R.V. and the State of Viet Nam were represented at the Conference, a factual recognition of the reality of two long separate and competing states in Viet Nam. The final products of the Conference, reached on July 21, 1954, are widely known as the Geneva Accords of 1954.

The Geneva Accords with respect to Viet Nam consisted of an Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, signed only by representatives of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and the French Union Forces in Indo-China, and an unsigned Final Declaration of the Conference. The Agreement On Cessation Of Hostilities which, as was indicated by the fact that it was signed, was the core of the Accords, provided principally for a military cease fire to be followed by a regroupment of opposing French Union and D.R.V. forces to the South and North respectively of a provisional military demarcation line, a limitation on the introduction of armaments and military personnel in order to prevent further conflict between the opposing forces, and the creation of an International Control Commission to supervise the execution of the agreement. Civil administration was to be in the hands of the party whose forces were regrouped in that zone pending general elections for the unification of Viet Nam. The Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities was dated July 20, 1954. The Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference made on July 21, 1954, which reiterated the spirit of the cease fire agreement and which dealt in slightly more detail with the provisions for elections was signed by no one. It was orally approved, however, by all of the nine states attending the Conference except the United States and the State of Viet Nam each of whom made unilateral declarations of their own. The United States declared that it would refrain from the use of force to disturb the settlements, in accordance with its obligations under the United Nations Charter but would view any future aggression in violation of the agreements as seriously threatening peace and security. The United States also reiterated its position that "peoples are entitled to determine their own future, and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this." The State of Viet Nam, toward which, as has been seen, there existed expectations that it was an independent state under international law at this time and which was not a party to the Accords protested them. In a final declaration which the Conference took note of, however, the State of Viet Nam pledged itself not to use force to resist the cease fire arrangements in spite of its general objections to those agreements.

Because the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam referred to a "provisional military demarcation line," and "regrouping zones" pending general elections for the unification of Viet Nam, and the Final Declaration said:

"The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the Agreement relating to Viet Nam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and

should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary . . ."

some have concluded that "under the Geneva Accords of 1954, South Viet Nam is merely a temporary zone not even qualifying politically as a state," and that aggression by North Viet Nam against South Viet Nam is merely a civil war, comparable even to the United States Civil War.

These conclusions are based on erroneous interpretations of the Geneva Accords. As has been seen, at the Conference, Viet Nam was represented by two states each claiming sovereignty to all of Viet Nam and each recognized as the only lawful government of Viet Nam by one or the other of the major opposing power blocs at the Conference. The Communist nations supported the credentials of the D.R.V., and the Western powers implicitly backed by the prior United Nations action supported those of the State of Viet Nam. Seen in context, then, this language as to provisional zones was intended to preserve the existing claims to sovereignty to all of a united Viet Nam by both the D.R.V. and the State of Viet Nam, and to indicate that the participants contemplated eventual unification of Viet Nam by free elections. This language was not intended to undercut the existing credentials of statehood of either of the contenders prior to unification. The participants at the Conference each wanted to avoid recognizing the government championed by the other side as a lawful government of any part of Viet Nam and each wanted to preserve the claims to sovereignty over all of Viet Nam of the government that they recognized. To say that the participants at the Conference intended to reduce the legal status of the particular government of Viet Nam that they recognized to that of a "temporary zone not qualifying politically as a state" is practically to state the opposite of what both sides intended. The declarations and actions of the parties before, during, and after the conference make this opposite interpretation evident.

Thus, the foreign ministers of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, in a February 18, 1954 Berlin Resolution agreeing on the holding of the Geneva conference said:

"It is understood that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-mentioned Conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded."

After consultations between the French and Soviet delegations at the Conference, the list of nine participating states, including both the D.R.V. and the State of Viet Nam was agreed to but again subject to this nonrecognition provision of the Berlin Resolution.

Similarly, French Foreign Minister Bidault made it clear in the opening address at the proceedings on Viet Nam that:

"For France, there is a Viet Nam State of which the unity, territorial integrity and independence must be respected. With the presence at this Conference of a party which, in order to fight against this state, has organized armed forces, has been admitted as a necessity with a view to bringing about a cessation of hostilities, this presence must not be interpreted as implying on our side any kind of recognition . . . The elements of this solution depend, first and foremost, in our opinion, upon the opinion which will be expressed by the Government of Viet Nam."

And in a later address at the Conference he reiterated that:

"[T]here does exist a Government of the State of Viet Nam. That Government is the government of His Majesty, Bao Dai, which is recognized by thirty-five states, is a member of various international organizations, and which is represented here in the eyes of all those who have recognized it. This Govern-

ment is fully and solely competent to commit Viet Nam. . . . The sovereignty and independence of Viet Nam are therefore recognized by France over the whole territory of Viet Nam. . . ."

Proposals made by both the State of Viet Nam and the D.R.V. at the Geneva Conference called explicitly or implicitly for recognition of the sovereignty of their particular government. And there is no indication in the records of the Conference in the *British Command Papers* or in the Accords themselves that the D.R.V. consented to relinquish its existing claims to statehood and sovereignty, at least over North Viet Nam, by signing the ceasefire agreement and acceding to the Final Declaration. Certainly the State of Viet Nam which expressly objected to the Final Declaration and which had not even signed the cease fire agreement did not consent to have its status reduced from a recognized state under international law to that of a mere zone. And the same is apparently true with respect to the interpretations by all of the other participants in the conference with respect to the accords on Viet Nam. There can be no better evidence of this intention than by the subsequent interpretations on this point by the participants in the conference itself. As the comments to the *Harvard Research Draft Convention on The Law of Treaties* indicate:

"In interpreting a treaty, the conduct or action of the parties thereto cannot be ignored. If all the parties to a treaty execute it, or permit its execution, in a particular manner, that fact may reasonably be taken into account as indicative of the real intention of the parties or of the purpose which the instrument was designed to serve."

Similarly, Article 69 of the *International Law Commission 1964 Draft Articles On The Law Of Treaties* provides:

" . . . There shall also be taken into account, [in the interpretation of treaties] together with the context: . . ."

"(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which clearly establishes the understanding of all the parties regarding its interpretation."

By way of subsequent conduct of the participants with respect to Viet Nam, the British government, one of the Co-Chairman of the Conference, said sometime after the Conference was concluded:

"The references in the title and text of this message to the 'Democratic Republic of Viet Nam' do not involve any departure from the policy of her Majesty's government in recognizing, in accordance with their obligations under Article 12 of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam as the only legal Government of Vietnam."

And, by way of further indication of this, the British Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said in the House of Lords on June 25, 1957:

"The present division of Viet-Nam into two parts on either side of the 17th Parallel dates from the agreements reached at the Geneva Conference of 1954. In the North authority is vested in the so-called Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam resident in Hanoi. The South is administered from Saigon by the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam of which Ngo Dinh Diem is President. Her Majesty's Government recognizes the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam as the sole Government entitled to represent the State of Viet-Nam in international affairs."

Similarly, in a dispute with respect to the maintenance of a United States consulate in Hanoi shortly after the Accords, both the D.R.V. and the United States seemed to interpret the Accords as preserving the statehood of the governments of the D.R.V. and the Republic of Viet Nam respectively. Later statements by the Soviet Union delegates to the United Nations are consistent with the

retention of claims to statehood by the governments concerned. In fact, although it is always difficult to prove the negative, a cursory but conscientious search indicates that none of the participants in the Geneva discussions on Viet Nam ever put forth the interpretation that under the Geneva Accords the D.R.V. and the R.V.N. were both merely "temporary zones not qualifying as states." In the face of the uncontradicted evidence of what the participants actually intended by the Geneva Accords such assertions of loss of statehood are untenable.

Certainly the participants in the Conference intended, at least by the language of the agreements, that Viet Nam be unified by free elections under one or the other of the competing governments variously recognized by the two sides. This, however, is quite a different intent from that of reducing the statehood of the D.R.V. and the R.V.N. to "temporary zones not qualifying as states." It is principally this intent that Viet Nam be unified by free election which is expressed by the "provisional zones" language in the accords. To suggest, however, from this intent that aggression by the D.R.V. against the R.V.N. is merely a "civil war" even comparable to the United States Civil War is to ignore the crucial fact, among others, that the central purpose of the internationally drawn provisional demarcation line in Viet Nam was for a military cease fire making aggression across that line unlawful. If nothing else, the two zones were at least intended as separate international entities with respect to the lawfulness of the use of force by one zone against the other. Consequently, even if the D.R.V. and the R.V.N. were not today two separate states, aggression by the D.R.V. against the R.V.N. is a fundamental breach of the Geneva Accords entitling the R.V.N. to the appropriate corresponding right of self-defense. Since this point has often been ignored, it bears emphasizing that even if this were a "civil war" in Viet Nam in the sense that there were no current expectations that two independent and separate states exist today in Viet Nam, nevertheless, the fact that armed aggression by the D.R.V. against the R.V.N. is in fundamental breach of an internationally drawn cease-fire line makes the legal consequences radically different from those attending a "civil war." As Professor Quincy Wright pointed out in the 1959 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law:

"Another complication may result from the protracted functioning of a cease-fire or armistice line within the territory of a state. While hostilities across such a line by the government in control of one side, claiming title to rule the entire state, seems on its face to be civil strife, if such lines have been long continued and widely recognized, as have those in Germany, Palestine, Kashmir, Korea, Viet Nam and the Straits of Formosa, they assume the character of international boundaries. Hostilities across them immediately constitute breaches of international peace, and justify "collective defense" measures by allies or friends of the attacked government, or "collective security" measures by the United Nations. If this were not so, armistice and cease-fire lines would have no meaning at all. . . ."

The United Nations action in Korea lends support to this distinction. Moreover, it cannot be validly maintained that the military demarcation line pursuant to the Geneva Accords no longer has validity in Viet Nam. For both the D.R.V. and the R.V.N. regard the Accords as having continuing legal validity and continue to make complaints to the International Control Commission. Furthermore, the decisions and continued functioning of the International Control Commission long after the July 1956 failure to hold elections also indicates the continuing legal validity of the internationally set demarcation line in Viet Nam. In addition,

apparently all parties concerned regard the Accords at least as the beginning point of any current settlement, and the general international community attitude bears out this expectation that the demarcation line is of continuing validity today. This continuing legal validity of the demarcation line in Viet Nam is consistent with the stated United States policy not to attack the integrity of the D.R.V. as a territorial or political entity, but simply to induce the D.R.V. to halt its armed aggression against the R.V.N.

The nearly ten years of separate development of the D.R.V. and the R.V.N. along different ideological lines after the date set for elections had come and gone indicates that the cease fire line established by the Geneva Accords in fact created continuing expectations of an international boundary between the D.R.V. and the R.V.N. The actions of the D.R.V. in continuing attempts to conceal their military direction and assistance with respect to the N.L.F., rather than openly admitting that the attack on the R.V.N. includes elements of the PAVN army, also provides some indication that the D.R.V. regards the cease fire line as a valid international demarcation line with respect to the employment of force across that line, and that they regard the use of force by the D.R.V. against the R.V.N. as something other than "civil strife."

Although some have argued that assistance even to the recognized government in a "civil war" should be outlawed because of the danger of civil strife escalating to international war, the same argument would appear to apply even more strongly with respect to the use of force by the D.R.V. across what is at least a factual international cease-fire line dividing the major contending ideological systems in the World today. And once significant outside armed aggression takes place across such a line against the established government, certainly the situation should give rise to appropriate rights of self-defense.

It should also be pointed out that there is no indication in the Accords themselves that they would cease to function should elections not be held. In the light of the complete lack of evidence of such an intent in the Accords and of the continuing evidence of expectations to the contrary this interpretation would be unwarranted. And it should be remembered that any argument depending on the cessation of the effect of the Geneva Accords because elections were not held would cut both ways. Under such a theory presumably it would also be a "civil war" should the R.V.N. openly invade the North even in some hypothetical situation in which they had no provocation. It is doubtful that in these circumstances the nations supporting the D.R.V. would be inclined to accept the "civil war" label and in any event this also would be too disruptive of minimum world public order. Consequently, such a theory of the expiration of the Geneva Accords when elections were not held would seem neither realistic nor attractive.

Moreover, despite the language of the Accords there are some indications that at least some of the participants at the Geneva Conference were aware that the Accords might result in indefinitely partitioning Viet Nam until genuinely free elections could be held. Anthony Eden's memoirs indicate his feelings in 1954 that the partition of Viet Nam was the best solution. In fact, in view of the German and Korean experiences partition seems a somewhat drastic way to arrange a cease fire and election if that was all that was contemplated by the parties. Moreover, the Accords are not notoriously heavy in election provisions, mentioning them only in a rather airy fashion. It was clear that the Conference had not come to grips with the key election problem in any meaningful way in 1954. With this background, it may well

be that the participants at the Conference were not particularly surprised when elections were not held in 1956.

In summary, the proponents of the view that the use of the military instrument by the D.R.V. against the R.V.N. is a "civil war" must establish not only that factually the Accords did not establish an international demarcation line creating expectations of two separate international entities in Viet Nam today, but also that the military cease fire line of the Accords had ceased to have legal validity prior to the D.R.V. aggression against the R.V.N., a result which does not automatically follow from a mere recitation of the language in the Accords to the effect that "the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary." For even if the line was not originally intended as a political or territorial boundary this does not mean that the cease-fire line itself, a major purpose of the Accords, is of no validity today on the issue of military aggression across that line.

The use of the military instrument by the D.R.V. against the R.V.N., then, is clearly not analogous to "civil strife" either for the purpose of assessing the lawfulness of that use or for the purpose of assessing the lawfulness of the repounding assistance to the R.V.N. This is so both because of the existence of substantial expectations today that the D.R.V. and the R.V.N. are separate and independent states under international law and in the existence of an international cease-fire line in Viet Nam violated by armed aggression of the D.R.V. against the R.V.N. The "civil strife" label, then, ignores the essence of the Geneva Accords in preference to a facile verbalism. Also, of course, the United States Civil War analogy is non-comparable, among other reasons because the "Hanoi regime is anything but the legitimate government of a unified country in which the South is rebelling against lawful national authority."

With respect to the effect of the 1954 Geneva Accords on the status as states of both the State of Viet Nam and the D.R.V., the Accords in no way lessened the established status of the State of Viet Nam or the existing claims of the D.R.V. Instead, they could only have strengthened the claims to statehood of the competing governments, particularly the seemingly weaker claims of the D.R.V., since the reality of the settlement was that the two governments had acquired, even if intended to be temporary, relatively fixed and separate territories and had participated in an important international conference even though that participation did not technically result in recognition of their asserted statehood by the countries of the opposing bloc.

In the nearly twelve years following the Geneva Accords, this reality of two separate and independent states in Viet Nam has become increasingly clear.

SENATOR RANDOLPH LEADS IN AID FOR THE BLIND

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, my distinguished senatorial colleague from the State of West Virginia, Mr. RANDOLPH, has accomplished a great many noteworthy deeds in his career as an educator, businessman, and legislator—but none is more deserving of recognition and expression of public appreciation than is his effort to promote programs to benefit the blind.

We here in the United States are fortunate that our standard of living and advanced knowledge of health practices have greatly reduced blindness among our citizens, for elsewhere in the

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

June 22, 1966

LET US TALK SENSE ABOUT VIETNAM—IT IS LONG OVERDUE

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, in an excellent article in today's New York Times entitled "Thant's Vietnam Proposals" commendation is given Secretary General Thant for "focusing attention again on the real problem in Vietnam, which is to move toward a negotiated settlement of the Communist insurrection."

The editorial pointed with approbation to Secretary General Thant's three-pointed proposal calling "for the cessation of bombing North Vietnam; the scaling down of military action in the south to achieve a cease-fire; the opening of peace talks among all those who are actually fighting, including the Vietcong."

Both the Secretary General and the New York Times are talking sense to the American people. My own views on the folly of our military involvement in southeast Asia have been expressed repeatedly for nearly 2½ years.

Force begets force; escalation begets escalation.

If a world conflagration is to be avoided—if indeed it is not too late—then the points suggested by the Secretary General should be heeded and no time should be lost to carry out his suggestions.

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial from the New York Times for June 22, 1966, be printed in full in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, June 22, 1966]

THANT'S VIETNAM PROPOSALS

Secretary General Thant has performed a useful service in focusing attention again on the real problem in Vietnam, which is to move toward a negotiated settlement of the Communist insurrection.

The bombing of North Vietnam and the buildup to more than a quarter-million American troops in the South have neither reduced the Vietcong forces nor stabilized the internal politics of Saigon. On the contrary, the Vietcong buildup also is continuing, aided by infiltration of regular North Vietnamese units. And the American takeover of the military conflict has simply freed the Buddhist and military politicians of South Vietnam to pursue their power struggle. There is little reason to believe that further escalation will change the picture.

Mr. Thant's suggestion is that a new attempt be made to deescalate instead. His three-point proposal calls for the cessation of bombing North Vietnam; the scaling down of military action in the South to achieve a cease-fire; the opening of peace talks among all those who are "actually fighting," including the Vietcong.

Sooner or later, this is the only way the war in Vietnam can be brought to an end. The unanswered question is how this process can best be set in motion.

The efforts of numerous intermediaries to bring Hanoi to the conference table have all run into the same demand: talk to the Vietcong's National Liberation Front. Until the Saigon government shows a willingness to do so, there will be no prospect of peace. But what incentive can there be for the military junta to seek a compromise settlement when American troops protect it against the consequences of political folly? The dream that the military balance can be turned and a

Communist surrender achieved will only give way to reality when the American commitment ceases to be open-ended.

At the present rate of buildup there will be 350,000 to 400,000 American troops in South Vietnam by the end of the year. The talk in Washington of higher targets of 600,000 or 750,000 American troops in 1967 and later is further encouragement to political irresponsibility in Saigon.

At some point a halt must be called. American forces may be able to contain the larger Vietcong units, but it is much more doubtful that they can destroy the Vietcong's political network or its guerrilla bands. Every whirl upward on the escalation spiral merely restores the military balance at best—but at a higher level. A halt in the buildup may prove far more effective in forcing the Saigon factions to unite and in bringing them to face up to the need of opening contacts with the other side.

THE FEDERAL PAY RAISE BILL

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I have received a number of wires from residents of the State of Oregon urging that prompt action be taken by the Senate on the Federal pay raise bill, H.R. 14122. In view of the importance of these comments I ask unanimous consent that the wires to which I have alluded be printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the telegrams were ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

SALEM, OREG., June 21, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Please do all in your power to bring H.R. 14122 to an affirmative vote this week. Thank you.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION POSTAL SUPERVISORS, LOCAL 225.

SALEM, OREG., June 21, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Urge your immediate action to expedite enactment of Government salary bill H.R. 14122 by July 1, 1966.

VERNON E. PAUL.

EUGENE, OREG.

COOS BAY, OREG., June 21, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Just returned from State convention. Important H.R. 14122 brought before Senate for immediate action. Urge your favorable support.

FRED CRAMER,
Secretary, Branch 1450 NALC.

SALEM, OREG.,
June 21, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington D.C.:

Request your support to expedite enactment of Government Salary bill, H.R. 14122.

CLYDE C. PIKE.

COOS BAY, OREG.,
June 20, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building, Washington D.C.:

Ladies State auxiliary, NALC urges your support of H.R. 14122. Important this bill passes at earliest date.

MILDRED SMITH,
State Legislative Chairman,
Auxiliary No. 173, CALC.

SALEM, OREG.,
June 21, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Your immediate action is urged for enactment of Government Salary bill, H.R. 14122 by July 1, 1966.

RUTH A. DAVIS.

SALEM, OREG.,
June 21, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Request your support in passing government salary bill, H.R. 14122, effective July 1, 1966.

M. RITA CROSBY.

SALEM, OREG.,
June 21, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

I wholeheartedly support you and your efforts in behalf of the Federal pay raise.

CARMALETTA Y. EGELSTON.

SALEM, OREG.,
June 21, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Urge support Federal pay bill. State competition makes Federal clerical recruiting difficult. Attractive pay essential.

NORMA I. GERBERDING.

SALEM, OREG.,
June 21, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Request your support for immediate enactment of H.R. 14122 approved by Senate Civil Service Committee.

THEODORE N. LAUSE.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
June 19, 1966.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Please support pay bill 14122.

A. W. CLARK.

PORTLAND, OREG.,
June 20, 1966.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D.C.:

Please do all possible to have H.R. 14122 reported out of the Senate Policy Committee.

TOM LINVILLE.

NORTH BEND, OREG.,
June 20, 1966.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

DEAR MR. SENATOR: We need your help for a favorable report on H.R. 14122 to be reported out of Senate Policy Committee. Please help us keep up with the yearly increased cost living.

Sincerely,

N. Irving Engle, Robert Emmett, Howard Fate, Memphis Hadden, Bev. Bigelow, Robert Klien, William Babbitt, Jack Clark, Jack Goll, Joyn Riesbeck, Jack Chanler, Al Carlson, Bud Grossen, Jim Hurst, Henry Lawdese, Les Croff.

GRANTS PASS, OREG.,
June 20, 1966.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.:

Oregon State Letter Carriers in session at Portland, Ore., ask your support of H.R. 14122 to get this bill reported out of Senate policy committee for immediate action.

ARTHUR H. STRUNK, Sr.,
Secretary, Oregon State NALC.

June 22, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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General WHEELER. I don't believe so. I think that we have adequate means to carry out any operations that I can foresee.

Question: What effect will the monsoon season have on the American war effort in Vietnam?

General WHEELER. Well, as you may know, the monsoon out there has opposite effects in the two parts of the Vietnam. In North Vietnam when the weather is good, it is bad in South Vietnam, and vice versa. And the monsoon is just changing now. We've had very bad flying weather up North in recent weeks and months. We have had good weather in the South. Now it is going to start to change. So our air operations in the North will be easier, but our air operations in support of our ground forces in the South will be more difficult. In other words, we'll have greater problems in flying when we want to fly.

Question: Do you feel that Premier Ky's retention of power could cause more military and political turmoil?

General WHEELER. I think that probably that it wouldn't cause any greater difficulties than we're having now.

Question: General Wheeler, why don't we employ nationalist Chinese troops in Vietnam?

General WHEELER. Well, there are several reasons. One, it would be in a sense expanding the war by bringing Chinese into an area where they are not particularly congenial to the population. Secondly, the nationalist Chinese have no particular desire to participate in that war down there. You'd open up a whole series of political problems.

Mr. GRANIK. Wouldn't that bring China in then?

General WHEELER. Well, this is one of the arguments, that it would bring Red China into the war directly. Again, I think this is debatable because it would depend on the circumstances in which these Chinese nationalist troops were used.

Question: General, are there mercenaries involved in Vietnam, and if so, what is their role?

General WHEELER. We have no mercenaries in the American armed forces. And I assure you that the Koreans are not mercenaries either. They are there at the direction of their government in support of their national policy of opposing Communism in the Far East. So there are no mercenaries in South Vietnam.

Question: Do you feel that free elections can be held in a country such as Vietnam in the political turmoil that it is in now?

General WHEELER. I think so, under—with care. As a matter of fact, there have been elections in the recent past for provincial posts, and so on, which were quite successful—a tremendous turnout and a very fine outcome for the government.

Mr. GRANIK. What happens then? How do we abide by these elections, General? Let's say the Viet Cong were successful in the elections.

General WHEELER. Well, it is unthinkable to me that they would be. And I think that Secretary Rusk is a better expert on this than I. I'd be trying to address a hypothetical question and I don't see how I can do it.

Question: Is Premier Ky daring the Buddhists to a showdown by declaring there will be no constituent government until 1967?

General WHEELER. I don't think so. Just a comment on what I understand he said. I believe that he is saying that the time that will be needed to draw up a constitution and to have elections will be somewhat greater than people think.

Question: Sir, is there any chance that the reservists and National Guard will be activated?

General WHEELER. Oh there's always a chance. If there is a sizable increase in the tempo of the war, if we are faced with other contingencies, why we, of course, would depend upon the National Guard and the reserves to augment the active forces.

Question: Sir, if they are activated, are they really ready for the kind of fighting that is going on there?

General WHEELER. I think so. Now we have, as I mentioned earlier, certain units that have already been selected. These are the high priority units—to receive special and additional training so that their readiness has been increased. And this is always an incremental step if you call the National Guard and reserve into action, and so I think my flat answer to you would be yes.

Question: Sir, why do we have more commitments in our foreign policy than our nation can really afford?

General WHEELER. Well I don't think that we have. I think that the United States can afford to do those things to protect its own security interests and to assist our allies in protecting theirs. I don't believe that we are over-committing to use a simple phrase.

Question: To get off the subject of Vietnam, what do you see for the future of NATO?

General WHEELER. I believe that NATO is going to remain a viable military alliance. Now, undoubtedly, there are going to be changes made and these are being discussed at the highest governmental levels, and when I say governmental, I mean all the governments of NATO, except France, at this time. Our NATO partners apparently are all agreed that NATO is a valuable security mechanism and they and we are determined to maintain it.

Question: Do you think West Germany will get nuclear weapons through NATO if France pulls out?

General WHEELER. No, that's not the object of the exercise by any means.

Question: Sir, does the moon have any military value?

General WHEELER. Well, at night it is awful useful to have the moon shining so you can see, but not to be facetious in answering your question, what you're really asking me is if going to the moon has a direct military application. My answer to you is that we don't know. What we do know is that the things that we learn in the scientific area by these space flights and these efforts to project man into space increase our entire knowledge of a broad spectrum of military interests. And it could be that someday the ability to put a man on the moon will have a direct influence on our security mechanism.

Question: Do you foresee the moon to become a battleground between the United States and Russia?

General WHEELER. I don't think so. I certainly hope not.

Mr. GRANIK. That's why we applaud the President's wonderful action urging unity there.

Question: How much emphasis do the Communists place on our youth demonstrations?

General WHEELER. It's very interesting. That's an excellent question. General Glap, who is the Minister of Defense of North Vietnam and who was the commander of their forces when they defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu, wrote a series of three articles which appeared in the Hanoi official newspaper in January. I read these articles with great interest. Glap, in these articles, and other articles and statements that I have read coming from North Vietnamese officials, and from China, for that matter, emphasized the fact that they are going to win this war politically, and they cite as an example of

why they will win politically, the fact that there are demonstrations, that there is support for their efforts in this country and in other countries of the Free World.

Question: Do you feel that the conquest of space, to return to space, should be set aside until we settle the problems of poverty, ignorance and disease?

General WHEELER. I don't believe so. I believe that our country is blessed with enough wealth, enough resources, in terms of scientific brains, vast industrial base, so we can push ahead on both fronts at the same time.

Question: General Wheeler, do you see any danger in the future of attack from outer space?

General WHEELER. As of right now, my answer to you would have to be a categorical no, and I would say that this is a problem that you young gentlemen and ladies here are going to have to address perhaps some time in the future. It is beyond my ken.

Question: General, why doesn't the Air Force release to the public its Blue Book Project on unidentified flying objects?

General WHEELER. You're asking me a question I simply can't answer, because I don't even know what the Blue Book Project is. However, I can tell you this, that the Air Force has made a very careful, elaborate investigation of every report of this kind that has ever been forthcoming, and to date, they haven't identified anything that is not explainable by natural means.

Question: Have the Fulbright Hearings, by acknowledging some Americans' uncertainty as to our position in Vietnam, encouraged our enemies?

General WHEELER. I don't think that I should comment on the deliberations in the Congress. It's not my place.

Question: Just how closely do the Joint Chiefs of Staff work with the State Department?

General WHEELER. Well, let's say it this way, the Department of Defense works extremely closely with the State Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of course, participate in all of these deliberations. It is a rather complicated mechanism. But we are always represented, either by me or, in the case of meetings between officials, by one of the officers of the Joint Staff, at all deliberations that have any military application at all.

Question: Sir, just how justified are the State Department's travel bans?

General WHEELER. Again, this is something you'll have to ask Secretary Rusk. That falls in his purview, not mine.

Question: Sir, why does the United States, a democracy, support a military dictatorship, largely despised by its people?

General WHEELER. In what country are you talking about?

Question: Vietnam, sir.

General WHEELER. Let's say this. You have had in Vietnam a series of governments. The latest government is a military dictatorship because this is the power base in South Vietnam.

Mr. GRANIK. I'm sorry to interrupt, General. I know there are many more questions, but unfortunately there just isn't any more time. Thank you General Wheeler for being our guest on Youth Wants to Know. Our thanks to you, panel, for your most interesting questions, and to you, ladies and gentlemen, for being with us. Please join us again next week on Youth Wants to Know, where through the eyes of youth, we explore and discover, we measure the important people, ideas and events of our time. And now this is Theodore Granik bidding you good-bye.

Produced by: Theodore Granik.
Associate Producer: Jay B. Cutler.
Assistant to the Producer: Janet Calhoun.

If we are to continue our past progress in the sale of soybeans, both at home and abroad, we have no other alternative but to increase soybean yields per acre. However, higher yields depend on production research. Unfortunately, Federal research funds in the past have been insufficient.

I strongly urge an appropriation which will enable us to maintain an effective research program in soybean research, in order to augment yield per acre to meet domestic and export demands. By making certain that adequate funds for soybean research are available, we reassure our productive and efficient farmers of their vital role in the Nation's economy and recognize their help in easing the balance-of-payments gap.

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, it is the duty of a leader to lead, not follow. Leadership that has been unwavering has been ours, thanks to the determination of President Johnson. And it is paying off, too, as becomes increasingly apparent with virtually every passing day.

The successes of American foreign policy have not escaped attention, despite the continuing criticism from some quarters. In its current issue, Life magazine, for one, takes editorial note of these successes. And in today's Washington Post, columns by Roscoe Drummond and Rowland Evans and Robert Novak present further commentary on the steady improvement of the situation in Vietnam and elsewhere. I ask unanimous consent that each of these reports be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial and article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Life magazine]

L.B.J.'s FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESSES

The Johnson administration has been looking for fresh ideas and initiatives in foreign policy. Examples are the President's espousal of a "summit meeting" of Latin American leaders and of regional development programs in Africa. Others probably lie ahead. Some White House advisers exude a new mood of resolute optimism. Johnson's critics dismiss all this as an "exercise in rhetorical rejuvenation" or attribute it to the White House fears of the coming congressional elections based on Johnson's own bad showing in recent polls. Yet a glance at the major sectors of U.S. foreign policy will show that a measure of optimism is not out of place.

Let us start with Europe. On the anniversary of D-day last fortnight, peace in Europe had lasted one day longer than it did between World Wars I and II. As it passed this milestone Europe had less reason to expect another war than at any time since the Cold War began. This despite De Gaulle's efforts to dismantle NATO. Even De Gaulle counts on the natural coherence of the Atlantic world, and its U.S. nuclear umbrella, for ultimate security. Meanwhile the changes in NATO are echoed by fissures in the Warsaw Pact, and the so-called "satellites" of Eastern Europe show increasing independence of Moscow.

In Asia there is a grisly war, but it is not a very dangerous one either to the U.S. or to world peace. Moreover, the news from Vietnam is so much better than a year ago that Johnson and McNamara ought to be taking bows instead of brickbats. The fierce battle

in the central highlands—a "spoiling attack" on General Giap's North Vietnamese troop concentrations—is another sign that the initiative has moved to U.S. and Vietnamese forces. The casualty ratio; the enemy desertion rate; the increased mobility, firepower and morale of Westmoreland's troops, all justify his confidence that he can handle the "monsoon offensive" which Giap may be preparing. Even the Saigon political situation looks more stable on the first anniversary of the Ky directory.

Red China is going through a purge, the first major split in its leadership since the Mao regime took power. It may signal the end of that regime and its successor may be less bellicose and more concerned with China's enormous internal problems. Maoism has lost all influence in Indonesia, whose new leaders have just terminated Sukarno's insane war on Malaysia and seem to be steering their unfortunate country back to ways of order and sense.

Indeed a new Asia is beginning to take shape. Perhaps its birthplace will be recorded as Seoul, the capital of an even bloodier war than Vietnam's only 15 years ago. In Seoul last week the foreign ministers of nine free Asian and Pacific countries—Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand—met to discuss their mutual desire to cooperate on trade, development and other common problems. For the first time the new men of Asia (as Thai Foreign Affairs Minister Thanat Khoman put it) "are getting together without being influenced by any of the former colonial powers." The initiative came from the proud leaders of the Republic of Korea, a successful new nation (economic growth rate almost eight percent a year) anxious to assert its Asian identity.

This new free-Asian regionalism is indigenous, not made in America, and it is welcomed by U.S. policy makers. The U.S. role is mainly to give it financial and technical aid, as through the Mekong Basin project and the Asian Development Bank.

In Latin America our main regional agencies are the Alliance for Progress and the Organization of American States. In what was widely criticized as his major blunder, President Johnson broke the letter of the nonintervention treaty on which the O.A.S. was founded when he unilaterally sent over 22,000 U.S. troops to quell the Dominican rebellion of April '65. That "blunder" does not look so bad today.

Johnson intervened, so he said at the time, solely to save lives and to assure a free election. He has succeeded in both. His intervention enabled the O.A.S. to take control of the troops of six nations (mostly U.S.) that have kept substantial peace for a year in the Dominican Republic. O.A.S. picked the provisional president, Garcia-Goody, whose disinterested integrity made the recent election possible. O.A.S. oversaw the voting and can now withdraw its remaining 8,000 soldiers as soon as the new president-elect, Joaquin Balaguer, agrees.

Balaguer campaigned on a promise of civil peace, and the Dominicans, especially the rural women, supported him with a landslide. One can even hope that the Dominicans, despite their long history of violence and tyranny, are now on the road to successful self-government. Hats should be off to Garcia-Goody, to the U.S. representative to the O.A.S., Ellsworth Bunker, and to all others who made possible this success story (knock wood) of inter-American diplomacy.

And not just diplomacy. Democracy also had a victory. The right of a people to choose their own government is the essential principle at issue in our struggle with Communism. Whenever a people freely exerts that right, our side scores a political victory of a kind that our adversaries can't answer.

An even more crucial election is scheduled in Vietnam in September. Some U.S. policy makers are gloomy about it, since the Vietcong will try to sabotage it and the Buddhists threaten not to participate. Yet the very prospect of an election, and Marshal Ky's evidently serious preparations for it, have already strengthened the directory. The U.S. has every reason to cheer the plans for this election. It could well result in the first broad popular base for a government in Saigon, and so make the political side of the war as hopeful as the military.

Johnsonian foreign policy has not been uniformly successful, nor should it get credit for all its own recent good news. But neither has it been the series of disasters some of Johnson's critics love to wallow in. We must be doing something right, for aggression is being contained, regional institutions of order are developing, some new countries are thriving, and there is even a little permeation of the Iron Curtain (as in Willy Brandt's East-West German conversations). If Johnson is serious in his talk of new initiatives in foreign policy, the time is opportune. He should ignore the polls when he knows that a policy is the right one, such as his attempt at bridge-building in Eastern Europe. The little outcroppings of sense, decency and hope now visible around the world prove that good policies sometimes have their reward. And there are ample opportunities ahead for U.S. policy to continue trying to make the world at least somewhat safer both for democracy and for diversity.

GAINS OF U.S. POLICY (By Roscoe Drummond)

Two of the most repeated arguments for the United States giving up in Vietnam are being disproved by events.

One is that Communist expansion is the wave of the future for all Southeast Asia and that nearly all the nations in this whole region would rather accommodate themselves to the inevitable than have the U.S. fighting back.

Not true.

The other argument is that the United States ought to quite defending South Vietnam because South Vietnam can't possibly hold together and we are bound to lose.

Not true.

The truth is that the Asian and Pacific nations not under Communist control have taken heart because of the strong American stand in Vietnam and are acting to establish a collective solidarity which seemed unthinkable a year or so ago.

Here's what's happening:

1. The foundations of a non-Communist region security system are being laid.

2. At a conference in Seoul nine countries—South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Nationalist China, Malaysia, South Vietnam, Japan, Australia and New Zealand—joined to create the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) patterned after the Organization of American States.

3. After a long period of isolation and hesitation, Japan, the most advanced and strongest nation in the Pacific, is being welcomed as an active participant.

4. The new government of Indonesia has severed the Djakarta-Peking axis, made peace with Malaysia and is considering joining the Asian Council. So is Laos.

5. India and Pakistan are moving into a much improved relationship which will almost certainly strengthen India's capacity to resist Chinese Communist attacks and tend to cause Pakistan to keep Peking at arm's length.

6. All of the members of the ASPAC are helping South Vietnam and the military commitments of some are expected to increase.

South Vietnam is not falling apart—though political turmoil makes it look at

June 22, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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SUMMARY OF LIPPES RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAM IN INDIA

Report on India—The urgency of overpopulation in individual families and the nation requires urgent and speedy solutions. With regard to this problem, India's greatest shortage is not transport, medical personnel or foreign exchange. The greatest shortage in India is time. The birth control revolution must be instituted in less than 10 years. If in ten years, India adds another 200 million people to its population, neither India nor her friends will be able to feed these new numbers.

1. The first pre-requisite in providing a service is to make it readily available. Within one year, the intra-uterine contraceptive device (IUCD) should be a routine procedure in all hospitals and in all dispensaries and health centers throughout India.

2. The second requirement is that more persons should know about this service and of what value it is to them. For this, the Central Government should establish a separate information service devoted entirely to family planning.

3. The incidence of abortions in India should be studied. How many illegal abortions occur in India each year? How many such abortion cases end up in hospitals? What percentage of hospital beds are occupied by abortion cases? What do such beds now cost the state? How many mothers die each year from the effects of induced abortion? How many Indian children are made motherless each year from the effects of induced abortions? What does this cost to the state?

4. The Central Government's Information Service should act as advisors to their counterparts in each state government. Obviously, the cultural and language differences will require separate state information services.

5. Increase in the numbers of health educators is important. The most effective way to start family planning programs is with the home visitor. This is well documented both in Korea and Taiwan. Both male and female educators are needed.

6. Establish family planning training and research institutions in every state to guide, spread knowledge and motivate doctors, civil servants, politicians, academicians and journalists in birth control. Each institute should be equipped with a small library on family planning subjects such as sociology, demography, communications, contraception, etc.

These institutions should have regular seminars and workshops of persons involved in family planning. The family planning newsletter should be enlarged. Each state family planning institute should submit articles reviewing and analyzing both their successes and their failures on a regular basis. This could be done first quarterly and next year on a monthly basis.

Establish in each state a completely independent evaluation cell which would review target attainments or failures and reasons for the same. Such cells should be used to encourage family planning workers with imaginative and constructive advice and not act as policemen or supervisors.

Establish training institutions for various medical and nonmedical workers to be involved in family planning.

7. Financial incentives should be of greater magnitude, e.g., each doctor should be paid Rs. 8/- for each loop insertion. This payment should be made both to government and private doctors. Rs. 5/- should be paid to subsidize the patient for being away from home for the day. Rs. 2/- should be paid to the village Dai or social worker or anyone else who brings the patient in for her loop insertion. This is a total of Rs. 15/- for each loop insertion, which is half of the current subsidy of Rs. 30/- now being paid for vasectomy. Nothing will promote the IUCD program faster than financial incentive.

8. Along this line, the government should organize the coupon referral system as is now practiced in Taiwan. In this system the health educator and the social worker register all those women who want to have the IUCD. The patients are issued a coupon. The patient then submits the coupon to the doctor who inserts the IUCD. The doctor then sends his coupons to the government in return for payment. The government will then know exactly how many loops have been inserted, where and among what age groups, because this information will be on the coupon. Sampling at a later date will show how many people are continuing the use of the IUCD. In this respect it is important to note that even in the first year about 20% will probably discontinue the method. Those persons who cannot use the IUCD will have to be offered other methods such as the condoms, foam tablets and birth control pills—probably on a free or subsidized basis.

9. Family planning as a career should be upgraded and glamorized with the awards and recognitions due the family planning workers.

The government should provide security to the people doing family planning work. This will also help to attract competent individuals.

10. Organizational changes should be instituted to prevent procedural delays, especially right now. Emergency or urgent problems require short administrative lines.

11. Encourage the Indian Medical Association, especially the private practitioners to form medical advisory committees in every state so that their skill and guidance can benefit the family planning program of India. The establishment of such committees will also insure the cooperation of the medical profession. Where important medical doctors remain unconvinced as to the value, safety or effectiveness of the IUCD, they should be placed on medical teams which would visit the successful districts, such as Ambala District in the Punjab, and the Hoogly and Bakara Districts of West Bengal.

12. The Central Government leaders should establish an old-age pension in order to decrease parental dependency on children. I believe this will go a long way in making the idea of a small family more acceptable to the mass of the Indian populace. A whole array of legislative devices should be utilized to promote family planning, e.g. no maternity leave after the third child.

13. The goal of the family planning program for the next 6 or 7 years should be 50 million effective contraceptors. All these 50 million would not be able to use the loop. Some of them should be offered the pills. It could be free to the poorest of the women who cannot use the loop. It should be partially subsidized to the middle-income people who cannot use the loop; the well-to-do should pay for their own medication.

14. The Central Government should provide funds to the states for follow-up therapy of loop patients.

15. The Central Government Family Planning Institute should write a guidebook on promoting family planning to suggest the proper approaches for various types of occupations, i.e., village farmers, the city clerk, priest, etc.

The Central Government Family Planning Institute must create training films for doctors, especially about the IUCD device. A list of indications and contraindications for IUCD insertions in the training program should be made.

16. All family planning centers should treat infertile cases as well as the overfertilized. This would put the family planning centers on a more positive basis.

I would expect the program to reach 3 million insertions in 1966. The target for 1967 should be 6 million. Thereafter, insertions should reach 10 million per year. The World Bank Report anticipated 6 million steriliza-

tions and 27 million couples accepting condoms by 1973. This is a reasonable goal. With this type of program of 25 million loop insertions by 1969, a real drop in the birth rate could be expected with a resultant improvement in the per capita income of all Indian families. Along with the increased production of fertilizers, this program will stave off the threat of massive famine of the 1970's.

One will then look forward to a generation of happy and prosperous Indians.

JACK LIPPES, M.D.

THE NECESSITY TO INCREASE SOY-
BEAN YIELD

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, President Johnson, in his food-for-freedom message, requested the American farmer to increase substantially the Nation's production of soybeans. The President said:

The demand for soybeans has climbed each year since 1960. Despite record crops, we have virtually no reserve stocks. To assure adequate supplies at prices fair to farmers and consumers, the Secretary of Agriculture will use authority under the 1965 Act to encourage production of soybeans on acreage formerly planted to feed grains. Feed grain stocks are more than sufficient.

In order to carry out the President's request, the National Soybean Crop Improvement Council, in conjunction with the Department of Agriculture, is conducting a national drive to get the American farmer to plant 3.5 million acres of soybeans this year—a 10-per-cent increase over last year.

Why the worldwide demand for soybeans? Soybean oil is recognized as the oil of the future in many countries of the world. Soybean meal as a protein for livestock feeding is used extensively in the United States and is being exported at an unexpectedly high rate to many countries. In the last 4 years, soybeans proved to be the top dollar earner in U.S. agricultural exports, thus substantially aiding our balance-of-payment problem.

However, the most important value of soybeans lies in their potential ability to feed the world's 1.5 billion undernourished persons.

A prominent company in my State, Central Soya of Fort Wayne, is contributing to the goal of transmitting vital protein from soybeans to the hungry and undernourished. Central Soya has developed an experimental cookie which contains soy protein concentrate and isolated soy protein. This practical cookie illustrates soybean potential in alleviating protein malnutrition.

Will soybean production continue to increase to meet worldwide demand? The answer is "no"—if we continue with our present policies. In the past, soybean production increase has resulted from increased acreage, since yields per acre have remained constant. Much of the additional acreage came from crops such as oats. However, for the future, soybean production increase will have to come from per acre yield increases, because, first, oat acreage is almost exhausted; and second, soybeans have difficulty competing with other crops for land due to low soybean yields.

The solution: Higher soybean yields per acre.

"Whatcha doin' with me?" he demanded. "I'm trying to tell ya—"

"Joe," said Blackstone. "It's late. We want you to have a good night's sleep. In the morning will be time enough."

So they put Joe in a suite at the Palmer House, called room service for ice, and bade the suspect good night. About 10 in the morning, they returned, bringing a basket of fruit and six law books. Wigmore took off his blue coat and began opening his suitcase.

"Ya gonna beat me up?" asked the hollow-eyed defendant. (It developed that he had not slept a wink all night).

"Heavens, no!" said the sergeant. He slipped into a sports coat, an ascot, and a shirt of vivid magenta. "The uniform, the badge, and the physical accoutrements of a police officer are in themselves symbols of oppression and intimidation, calculated to overpower the friendless and oppressed defendant. Please have a banana."

On their way to the Art Museum, over on the Boulevard, the detectives explained that in times past, in-custody interrogation had been psychologically oriented. Suspects had been questioned in privacy in bleak rooms at station houses. Isolation had served as a form of mental coercion. So they sat down at a little table in the museum's garden by the Triton Fountain, and Blackstone dug a tape recorder and three volumes of U.S. Reports from the bag.

"Now, Joe," he began, reading from Miranda v. Arizona, "you understand, do you not, that anything you say may be held against you? You are not required to say anything at all. If you would rather talk about sculpture, that is fine with us. Would you like another ginger ale?"

"Listen!" cried the defendant. "I've been tryin' to tell you since 2 o'clock this mornin', I sh—"

Wigmore clapped a burly hand across Joe's mouth. "If you say another word until you're advised about counsel," he said grimly.

"Police brutality," whimpered the suspect. Blackstone was still reading. "Our accusatory system of justice demands that the government produce the evidence against an individual by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple, expedient of compelling it from his own mouth. Would you like a lawyer, Joe? We can get you a lawyer right away. If you can't pay him, we'll pay him. How about a nice lawyer? We can suspend until he gets here."

Joe numbly shook his head. "I don't want a lawyer," he said. "Just want to tell you about Dollee."

Blackstone did his best, but Joe was adamant. He knowingly, willfully and intelligently declined his right to counsel. He refused to shut up, even when Wigmore begged him, and at last, a little before lunch time, they took Joe to State Street and booked him for murder.

The rest of the story is quickly told. Joe went and got a lawyer. In October, a jury heard the officers' testimony and found the defendant guilty. The sentence was 50 years, but before a day could be served, the lawyer took it to the Supreme Court. The holding (Doakes v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 417), further extended the Miranda rules. The high court threw out the evidence of Dollee's body, on the grounds that the room had been entered without a proper warrant. The fingerprints went out, on the grounds that Joe could not be thus compelled to incriminate himself. The confession went out because 22 hours had elapsed during the interrogation period. The sergeant had struck the accused in the mouth. The Palmer House and the Art Institute were deemed impermissibly unfamiliar surroundings. It was another landmark opinion.

Blackstone and Wigmore were suspended from the force on June 21, 1969, a year to the day from the crime. And the next night Joe went out and shot Lily May.

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, on June 16, an editorial, entitled "Time To Fish or Cut Bait," appeared in the Arizona Daily Star, the morning daily newspaper of Tucson, Ariz. William R. Mathews, the veteran editor of the Star, is an astute observer of national and international affairs, and I believe this editorial is both timely and provocative. I commend it to the attention of my colleagues and ask permission to have it printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TIME TO FISH OR CUT BAIT

(EDITOR'S NOTE.—The continuation of the Saigon riots with announcements calling upon the President to do what he can to relieve Premier Ky, and accompanied by "Yankee Go Home" threats, adds to the timeliness of the following editorial.)

When President Eisenhower originally made his commitment of American protection for South Viet Nam, the country was at peace. When President Jack Kennedy accepted that commitment, a reign of terror was just starting. He sent military and civilian advisers to the country and gave generous military and economic aid. When Lyndon Johnson became President, the reign of terror had become an organized war between the Viet Cong, under orders from Hanoi, and the South Viet Nam government, under President Diem.

When Lyndon Johnson became President in November, 1963, he accepted the original commitment and felt it his duty to aid the government in South Viet Nam. The American people overwhelmingly supported the President's action in escalating the war.

The situation now has changed to the point where Buddhists again are dividing the country in their campaign to unseat Premier Ky—the one Vietnamese who appears more and more as a courageous able leader. Should they succeed, the legal government will continue to be divided, and so will the military effort of the Vietnamese.

The promise to call an election to elect members to a Constitutional Assembly on September 11, amounts to putting the cart before the horse. Instead, the American precedent of 1776, with its resounding Declaration of Independence, should be followed. That is what should be done now, with a proclamation joined in by America to liberate Viet Nam from its invader. Then, once the country is pacified, a constitutional convention would be necessary and proper.

The country should unite in its war of liberation, and be pacified before any constitution is written. The calling of any election before this is done certainly will divide the country still more.

American military forces already are trapped. In a few months they will be confronted with a still more chaotic civil anarchy. They will be fighting courageously, with a kind of religious-political war dividing the country they hope to save.

President Johnson has made a record of remarkable patience. He properly supported Premier Ky. He has been so tolerant of the anarchy and the personal abuse of himself by the Buddhists, that patience and toleration have ceased to be a virtue. As this continues, his personal popularity has declined sharply. The Gallup Poll figures prove it. But they also reflect the heartbreaking stalemate our military forces, and the growing disgust and anger of the American people with the conduct of the Buddhists.

The time has come for the President to act. That means he must publicly call the turn in Viet Nam. He must come out again publicly for Premier Ky and call for all Viet-

namese to unite behind him until the country is liberated. He must frankly caution all discordant elements, like the Buddhists, who may refuse and continue their anarchy, that such a course will leave no alternative than for him to order the withdrawal of all American military and economic help. He well might explain to them that hundreds of thousands more of American military personnel, and billions more of economic aid dollars, cannot liberate a country that cannot govern itself, and where the people are apathetic about their liberty.

Such an announcement would resound throughout the world. It would restore the unity of the American people, and the chances are fair that it would bring an end to the prevailing anarchy. It would inspire both the American and Vietnamese military forces. By America's election day in November, the pacification of the country should show good progress. The end of the war could be assured reasonably within 12 months, if not sooner.

If the President continues his present policy, the tension probably will snap this coming autumn. There could be a big blow-off of some kind ignited possibly by the fraud charges that will be a part of any election. In that case, the President would face a mounting number of angry people, and their anger easily could spread to the boys who are doing the fighting in Viet Nam.

Surely the President, who knocked the heads of labor leaders and bosses together to forestall catastrophic strikes, should realize he is going to have to do the same thing with the religious and political leaders of South Viet Nam. The extent of the American commitment there demands it.

If the people of South Viet Nam will not unite and fight their common enemy, if they persist in savage anarchy, they should be told what the score is. America in such circumstances has no alternative other than to withdraw.

DR. JACK LIPES, INVENTOR OF IUD, MAKES RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAM IN INDIA

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, Dr. Jack Lippes, originator of the Lippes IUD, returned to Washington yesterday to report on a month-long tour of family planning centers in India. The Government of India invited him to discuss family planning services in India with physicians, public health officials, and maternal and child health specialists.

Dr. Lippes sounded a dire warning that if Indian population growth is not slowed down and India adds another 200 million people to its population in 10 years, "neither India nor her friends will be able to feed those new numbers."

Dr. Lippes then proceeded to make a number of recommendations designed to help India make progress in slowing down her rate of population growth.

I believe that all Americans should be aware of the great test which India faces in her attempt to plan for her future and show that the world's largest democracy can succeed in her attempt to control her rate of population growth.

I ask unanimous consent that Dr. Lippes' recommendations be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the recommendations were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

June 22, 1966

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grow. This is exactly what happened. During certain great periods of our history, the American people have looked upon their constitutional rights not as harsh duties to be ignored or done as quickly or easily as possible, but as opportunities for improved government and public service. We have challenges as great as those faced by earlier Americans: a government often mediocre and corrupt, a nation apathetic and non-participating, a world impoverished and brutal, and injustice in our world and sometimes in our own nation. We can do so much if we will look upon our governmental rights as tools with which to make a better life for all people.

The American people must realize that democracy is much more than realizing what a fine government we have or listening to fine speeches on the Fourth of July. We must realize that a government of the people, by the people, and for the people will be only as strong, as free, and as effective as its people. When this age has passed, the democratic process will be more glorious and complete than ever dreamed possible, or the democratic dream will be a reality no longer. We, the children of a free and affluent nation have a unique contribution to the democratic process. The Space Age has given us great dangers to the free way of life; it has also given us great tools to meet those challenges. We must remember the words of the great parliamentarian Edmund Burke, "The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing."

THE NEW ASIA

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, a new Asia is being born.

This is news of major importance, but not the kind of news that we would normally read in the newspapers.

It is one of those things that takes place slowly before our eyes—and is not seen. It is one of those things that happen today—and then is recognized in a year or 5 years as being of great significance.

We live so much in the shadow of violence and of crises that constructive things escape our notice. If 500 young men and women complete their education with honor and with high promise, we may find it on page 17. If one youngster gets in trouble, it is likely to be on page 1.

Terror, violence, bloodshed—all are spread before us in word and picture, day in and day out. You have to look hard to find the quiet and constructive works that are going forward, here at home and around the world.

But these works are there.

I said that a new Asia is being born. I do not think that is too extravagant a description. And when we look back, a few years hence, I think we will recognize that 1965 and 1966 were a decisive turning point in the life of that large, heavily populated and vastly important part of the world.

Last week, in Seoul, Korea, the representatives of 10 Asian and Pacific nations met. Seven of them were foreign ministers; the others were high officials of their governments. They represented Australia, the Republic of China, Japan, Korea, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.

They determined to work more closely together for the mutual benefit of their people. They chartered a course

for cooperation in economic, technical, cultural, social, and information fields. And for these purposes, they established the Asian and Pacific Council.

They plan to invite the other free nations of Asia to join them. They agreed to meet again at a high governmental level next year. Meantime, a headquarters for the new organization is to be established. And specialized groups will be formed immediately to begin working on the development of programs to achieve their goals of closer cooperation in a wide variety of peaceful areas.

The Seoul meeting—and the organization that has emerged—were the fruits of Asian initiative. We were not present. Nor were we in the wings pulling strings. We were in the audience, and we applauded.

Mr. President, Asia is on the move. A free Asia, a cooperating Asia, an active and progressing Asia.

It will be recalled that a year ago—at Johns Hopkins University—President Johnson spoke out for the works of peace in Asia. He called on the countries of southeast Asia to "associate themselves in a greatly expanded effort for development." He said he would ask the Congress for a billion-dollar American investment in that effort once it was underway.

Stemming directly from the President's speech, new Asian initiatives were launched. An Asian Development Bank has been born. Old rivalries are being submerged in the effort to move jointly ahead in overcoming the problems that haunt most of the people of that vast area—disease, illiteracy, poverty, maldistribution, the shortage of capital, and many others.

Asia is now moving ahead on the path of peaceful development.

But let us note one item of the greatest importance.

Would all this have happened if our President had not taken the course of strength and courage in facing up to the threat of aggression in Vietnam?

Would Asia now be able to think of cooperative training centers—and institutions of learning—and schools of medicine—and engineering tasks—if we had backed out of Vietnam?

If Vietnam had been allowed to fall under Communist rule, would the men in Indonesia who faced the threat of imminent Communist takeover from within have had the courage to stand up and beat it back? Or would they have read and heeded the signs that communism was on the rise—and made their peace as best they could?

But we did stand firm in Vietnam, and it is not under Communist rule. As a direct result, Asia is astir—with plans, with hopes, and with action.

When people ask why we are in Vietnam, this is a good part of the answer.

It is so that Asians can have a future, so they can make plans, so they can build, so they can be the masters of their own destiny.

Our dearest hope is that soon we can devote our energies and our imagination and our resources to cooperating even more fully in that great venture. For we would prefer to build, not to destroy.

Mr. President, we are witnesses to, and participants in, a great event. A new Asia is truly being born.

POLICE INTERROGATION OF CRIMINAL SUSPECTS

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, there has been considerable public outcry in recent days over the Supreme Court decision rendered June 13 concerning police interrogation of criminal suspects. Understandably so, much of the alarm which has been expressed has come from law enforcement officers.

This decision, which lays down strict regulations for the questionings of arrested persons, which virtually bans effective police interrogation and will very likely make questioning a thing of the past. In the words of Justice Harlan in his dissent:

How much harm this decision will inflict on law enforcement cannot fairly be predicted with accuracy.

At a time when the crime rate in the United States is soaring to disturbing heights, the Court's recent decision is indeed, as Justice Harlan declared, "a hazardous experimentation."

Mr. President, there appeared in yesterday's edition of the Washington Evening Star an excellent editorial column by James J. Kilpatrick concerning the Court's decision. By treating this column in a satirical fashion, Mr. Kilpatrick makes his point with tremendous impact. I commend this column to Members of the Senate and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE HISTORY OF ANOTHER LANDMARK DECISION
(By James J. Kilpatrick)

It was a little after midnight on the night of June 21, 1968, when the call came into Chicago's Homicide Bureau at 11th and State Streets. Lieutenant Blackstone and Detective Sergeant Wigmore picked up their suitcases, which always were kept packed for such emergencies, and headed for the scene of the crime.

They proceeded to an address off Archer avenue, and mounted all alone to the third floor. There, just as the anonymous tipster had said, they found a trickle of blood flowing from beneath a locked door. With one kick, the door gave way. Inside, sure enough, they found the body of Dollee Mame, twin sister of Lily May Mame, a young lady of the evening not unknown in those precincts. She had been shot through the head. A pistol, still warm, was found nearby.

Relying on what scraps of information they could find, Blackstone and Wigmore were soon on the trail of one Joseph Doakes, 25, who was reported, in the jargon of the district, to have been "shacked up" with the deceased. About 2 a.m., they found him cowering in a nearby alley. The police approached with friendly smiles and outstretched hands.

"Ya got me," said Joe.

"Hush!" cried Blackstone.

"Not a word!" cried Wigmore. "The accusatorial stage has been reached!"

The officers put Joe into the commissioner's limousine, and drove off to the Palmer House. They discussed the White Sox. They reviewed movies. But the suspect remained distraught and uneasy.